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y 
A THESIS FUL !LL. E 
1962 
- STRAOT 
The hearings on Gener~l Douglas Mae.Arthur 's dismissal 
conduo ·ted by t .he United Stat es Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relation s and Committe-e on t ..,_;.e Armed Services were con-
cerne d with the relationship between the civil and the 
militar1 , the comparab le importanee of Europe and Asia , and 
the validity of the concept of limite d war . This thesia is 
an ex?mination o! the genera l ''s actions and st atements 
whieh caused Pre sident Truman to doubt the effectiveness 
with which the genera l could carry out the policies of the 
United States and the United Natio ns._ It also examines 
American policy toward postwar China and actions taken 
during the Korean War as t hey ~ere discussed in the hear• 
in.gs. . The ef f ects of Ameri can relat i ons with its allies, 
the Soviet Unio ·R~ and the United. Natitm on the Korean 
aetion are also disoussed • 
After reading articles in the p~~5ressiQnal Record ., 
The General and the President by Rovere and Sehles i nger , 
and other general w-orks, the writer of this thesis studi d 
the published ¢ommittee hea ri ngs whieh supp lied th e main 
part of the material used in tbe thesis . When additional 
o1arifieation was needed• books such as 1 alter JV illis '' 
Arms and tb,e State or Truman's Memoirs \1ere h~lpful . ______ ....,._......,_......,...___ 
iii 
From the testimony iven be.f ore the Senate conunittees ;t 
it is conelud ed th at the Pr esi dent bad jus tif'ia ble reasons 
£-o:r dismis sing Douglas M e Art hut', alth ough i ~ dofe -rence to 
t he general ' s · -past serv i ce to the country, he ig ht hav.e 
asked t he general to resign . 
President Trtuum aeted in the inte rest of . the free 
world when he committed American tr oops to save Sout Korea 
from the Corrununists, alt hou h the neees s it,y i'or .such action 
migh t have en avoided had the administration• Congress , 
\ and t he count ry been wil lin g to spend mo.re money for deter -
rent arms and foro ,es in areas of pro ba ble confliet,. Unde r 
the cond.it~ons existing at the time ·Truman '' s e.fforts to 
l imit t he -war-action to Kor ea and to give priority to 
Eur 6pe as t he area where it was most imp·ortant to maintain 
strength !or the containment of Soviet expansionism w re 
eo mm:en-dable . 
iv 
The wri te:t would like to , thank Dr~ David Warr&n for 
b1e continued help during the writing of this the .sis . By 
ottering suggestions on the writing 0£ the thesis and in 
cor ecting the nu.¼nus.¢ript• Dr •. Dani .el Thomas as e.1-so ot 
substantial assistanoe . The writer would also .like . to 
express her app.reeiation to the members o.f tn~ start of 
th& university of Rhode- laland lib ,r-acy tor their invalu"" 
able help in obtaining inf'ormatien tor the bhesis.,. 
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CI1APTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On Apri l 17, 1951, General Douglas MacArthur 
returned to the United States after an absence of four-
teen years. Six days e_arlier the President of the United 
States, Harry s . Truman , had dismissed him with the 
explanation, "General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is 
unable to give his wholeh~arted support to the policies of 
the United States Government and of the United Nations in 
matters pertaining to his official duties . 01 
Vociferous denunciations of and ar guments aga inst 
the President's action immediately burst forth. Repub-
licans demanded permission for t he General to speak 
before a joint session of Congress. In caucus, t hey 
discus se d the possibility of impeaching Mr. Truman . Sen-
ator Richard Nixon suggested a Senate censure of the 
~resident and pressure on him to restore MacArthur to his 
command. Senator Kenneth Wherry introduced a resolution 
providing .for an investigation of' the General's re moval .. 
In sho nt, most Republicans were out to make as much poli-
tic al capital as possible out of this abrupt dismissal , 
----~ ....... -------------------------1 Harry s. Truman, Memoirs ., Vol . II: Years o.f T!:!a! 
and HW; ( New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p ~ 449. See page of appendix for excerpts from 'l'rum:sn•s add.ress to 
the nation . 
2 
although a few Eastern Republicans, James Duff and 
Leverett Saltonstall, for exa mple, support;ed Truman . 1 
Meanwhile, Democrats were seeking to identify 
MacArthur and the conservative Republicans with a plan 
for forcing a major war with China., althou gh Southern 
Democrats were, in many cases , less than enthusiastic 
in their support of Truman . Senator Tom Connolly, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 
Senat or Richard Russell • Chairman 0£ the Senate Armed 
Services Committee., both supported Truman . Sena.tor 
Russell soon announced an investigation by his committee 
P th f t b ~ · d M A th ' d. · l 2 
-0..1. . · e a.e s e111n 1 iac r . ur s ismissa • When it 
became obvious that the country was interested in more 
tban the military aspects of the question, the Foreign 
Relations Committee expressed an interest in participating 
in the bearings . A unanimous consent decree was intro-
duced by Senator Russell on April 25 and the hearings 
began on May 3.3 
1New York Times, Apri l 12, 1951 . 
2fil9: ., April 16, 1951. 
3Members of the Committee on Armed Services were 
Richard B. Russell, chairman, Harry F . Byrd ., Lyndon B. 
J ohnson, Estes Ke.fauver , Lester C. Hunt, John c. Stennis , 
Russell B. Long, Styles Bri'dge .s, Leverett Salt onstall, 
layne Morse , William F. Knowland, Harry Cain• Ralph 
Flartders . On the Committee on Foreign Relations were Tom 
Connally , chairman, Walt er :F. Georg e, Theodore Francis 
Green,, , Brien McMahon, J . William Fulbright , John J. 
Sparkman, Guy Gillette , Alexander Wiley, H. Alexander 
Smith, Bourke Hickenl ooper, Henry Cabot Lodge, tTr., and 
Charles Tobey . 
3 
On April 19 General Mac rthur appeared be.fore a 
joint meeting of Congress ond .forcefully presented bis 
views to the world. In this speech and in the opening 
days of the hearings, it became evident that there were 
three main issues to be aired before the committees . 
These were the old argument of civil versus military con-
trol , the comparable importance of Europe and Asia, and 
the extent to whioh a limited wa:r, as compared t o a .. large-
seale war, could achieve American objeetives . 1 
One of the main problems eorm.ected with the hearings 
and the one whiah pr~vented them f:rom being held in public 
was that of revealing classified in.formation. TranseriJ>tS 
of the sessions were reviewed and censored by a military 
officer and by a legal adviser to the State Department 
before being turned over to the press . General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur was the first witness, follow .ed by Sec-
retary of Defense George c . Mar8hall , and then by General 
of the Army Omar Bradley, _ Chait'man of the Joint Chiefs of 
Sta.ff . The committee$ next questioned the Chief's of Staff 
of th,~ services: Army General J . Lawton Collins; Air Force 
j 
General Hoyt s. Vandenberg; and Admiral Forrest P . Sherman. 
Chief of Naval Operations . Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
appeared to answer political questions . Lieutenant G,eneral 
lllbert C .. Wedemeyer~ Former Secretary of Defense Louis A. 
Johnson , Vice Admiral Os tltt: c. ~ ager , Maj or tQeneral 
1New York Times, April 15., 1951 (see page 108 of 
appendix l.'or ex cerpts-from address). 
4 
Emmett O'Donnell • Jr. , and Major General David c. Barr were 
the other witnesses . 
CH.AP'f'ER II 
POSTW.Pffi RELATIONS IN THE FAR EAST 
Victory over Japan 
Although t he general purpose o.f the hearin gs was 
supposed to be t he wei ghi ng of General MacArthur's removal, 
Republicans eagerly took the occasion to berate the admin-
istration ror allegedly losing China a£ter 'vorld War II . 
Democrats joined the Republicans in questioning George 
Marshall, Dean Acheson, Albert \'iedemeyer , and Pat rick 
Hurley to ascertain whether our post-war policy was justi-
fiable under eondit .ions existin g at the ti me. The ques -
tions ranged from the contr ib utions of Communist China in 
t he strug gle against Japan through the 11conces s i on.s" o! 
Yalta and the American role in the formation of a coalition 
government of Nationalists and Communists in ,Chj_na. 
Upon ta.king the stand 1 Secretary of S~ate Dean 
Ae hes ,on spent several hours explaini ng th e admi nistr ati on's 
policy in .Asia a.ftex· 1945 , including an outline of the 
historical background of the Crime an Conference at Yalta. 
Af'ter it was seen t h .at there was insufficient time in the 
hearinss t:or one o! th e participants o.f t he conference, 
w. Averel l Har r i man, to testify orally, Senator Brian 
McMahon called for a written r·eport by Mr. 'Harriman.. 
5 
6 
Because t he sworn statement whi ch he submitted te t he 
committee is a good summary of t he ad.ministration's posi-
tion on post-war events. it will be used 1n t his paper, 
to geth-er with Dean AQheson's testimony, as a basis for 
explaining tne official policy of the United States. 1 
Russ ian soldiers ·and civilians had fought the German 
invader with coura ge .and perseverance . By keeping approx-
imately 199 German divisions and 50 divisions of t he other 
Axis countries ~ngaged in the East, t he Soviet Union had 
eased the dangers o,f the Normandy invasion . This invasion 
might,. indeed, .have been impossible without this ot her 
front in the East. 2 Because of the strength of t he Soviet 
Uni.on, Pr esident Roosevelt and Prime Ministe r Churchill 
realized the importance of main.taining good relations with 
this nation during t he war.3 
In February 194.5 the administration believed that 
Russian participation in the strug gle against the Japanese 
would be necessary to ensure victory . Because 0£ their 
ambition to maintain influence over Manchuria, the Russians 
would have attacked the Japanese there in any event. The 
---------------------------- · -1tJ .s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Serviee :s 
and Committee on Foreign Relations• ~~arin ~s, _The 11-U.lit$rz 
fil:_tuatioq in the Far E~st, 82d Cong., 1st ess., 195!, 
pp .. }328-42. Hereafter noted as Militarz Situation in the 
Far East. - · · · · ' 
....., ...... . . ...._._, 
2 Ibiq•• P• 3329. 
3Ibid .. • pp .. 1878-79, Acheson* s testimony. According 
to Senator Wayne Morse this would account for commun ications 
which might seem overconeiliatery in the light of later 
events. 
? 
i mportant question at Yalta was whether t hey would do so 
soon enough to save American lives, a ques tio n which could 
only be decided by assessing the costs of a victory over 
Japan. 1 
In support of his thesis of t he uncertainty of vic-
tory in Japan, Acheson r eferred to the ent r ance of American 
troops in Manila on the f irst day of the Yalta Conference, 
with the deci s ive battles ·of Iwo Jima and Okinawa stil l 
ahead . I nformation available showed t hat the Japanese still 
had a fighti ng f orce or fi ve million men. la nned strate gy 
for an as s ault on Kyushu in t he fall o! 1945 and a lan di ng 
on Honshu as late as t he spri ng of 194•6 would have involved 
an American force o.f approximately .fi ve million men, of 
which it had been es timated t hat casualtie s mi ght be as 
hi gh as a million. 2 
Harr.iman pointed out that t he pri mary source of i nfor-
mation which Roosevelt had .at t he Yalta Conference was a 
memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jan uar y 23, 19~5, 
that "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible con-
sistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations 
is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific ___________________________ ,.__~ 
1Ioid., PP• 1875-76 and 3332. 
- .. 
2Ibid., p. 1985. In an article on this part of the 
hearin g s in the New York Times or . June 21, 1951, the , corres-
pondent stated that t he fi gure of a million casualties men-
tioned by Acheson as necessary to subdue Japan was fantastic, 
that thi$ would have exceeded all American casualties in the 
war. Later in the hearin gs, Patrick Hurley blamed Ache son 
for the .fi gure• althou gh it had been published by Secretary 
of War Stimson on the basis of military advice given him. 
I 
\ 
8 
operations . 111 The Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff were unanimous in 
the belief that a Rus s ian committal in the Far East was a 
"very essential factor" in bringing the war to an early 
end; as military leaders, they consid ered that a - campai gn 
by the Soviet Union against the Japanese in Manchuria and 
Korea was necessary . 2 Aleo, General MacArthur had very 
stron gly urged a landin g on Japan as a means of conclu din g 
the war, and according; to General M~rshall, such an action 
would have required support from Russia . } 
In support of the need for Russian intervention, 
Marshall emphasized the determination of the Japanese to 
fight until the end ~ When Japanese representatives in Axis 
and neutral countries of Europe had appealed to the Prime 
Minister of Japan to work for an armistice, he had mentioned 
the difffculties of formulating surrender proposals in view 
of t he intransi gence or the Japanese army. It was the 
opinion of the Joi nt Chiefs that only a tremendous pressure 
or an ex t raordinary shock offered any hope of ending the 
army's rule in Tokyo. 4 
Some witnesses, e . g ., Patrick Hurley, testified that 
it was known or should have been known at t he time of Yalta 
that the atomic bomb should produce the shock needed to 
topple the enemy army from power . Senator McMahon, chair-
man of the Atomic Energy Committee-, immediately refuted 
Hurley's statement and quoted a remark of General Leslie 
l ills!·, p. 3332. 2 Ibid ., p . 565. 
-4Ibid ., PP• 560-62 . 
-
9 
Groves, wartime a.dministr tive head of the atomic bomb 
project, that the scientists had often .felt on the brink of 
failure. 1 Administration officials held that not until 
five months a:fter Yalta did the first explosion take place 
in Ilew Mexico• and scientists even then were not sure that 
the bomb would be successful. 2 It would thus seem that . 
altho hone mi5ht w~ll agree with a statement by MacArthur 
that the United States did not need Russian support after 
the bomb was dropped and t hat tbe Soviet Union's contribu-
tion in Asia was negligible, it was by no means evident at 
the time or Yalta that the bomb would be of any practical 
use. 
In support of the view that the belief in the need 
for Russian intervention was widespread, Senator McMahon 
read a speech by Republican Alexander iiley which was given 
on July 25; 1945, long after Yalta, in which Wiley decidedly 
advocated Russian intervention.3 
11!?.!,g,., p. 2s95. In , an answer to a letter from Sen . 
Hickenlooper on this subject, Lt . Gen. Groves asserted that 
Stim son had informed Roosevelt of a ninety-nine per cent 
certainty on t he part of the scientists that the atomic 
bomb would be succes sful and very powerful .( ill9. ., P~ 3119). 
2 Ibid., p. 229. In an article in t he New York Times 
o.f June--;o-; 1951, William L. Laurence agreed with the 
administration on these points: few scientists thou g l$ the 
bomb would be powerful and effective; most believed tha t 
the explosion at Alaraagordo would have little force; and 
with only three bombs in existence• it was unlikely that 
one of them would have been wasted if there was certainty 
of the success of the experiment . 
3Ioid . , PP• 2060-62. 
--
-10 
The Yalta Agreement 
This belief in the need for Rusaian help against the 
Japanese led to the inclusion of those controversial pro-
visions of the Yalta Agree~ent concernin g areas in the Far 
East in which Russia claimed an interest . In his explana-
tion to the Committees, Harriman explained that Sta1in out-
lined the Soviet political objective in the Far East in 
1944 as the reestablishment of the approximate situation 
which had existed before the 1905 .Russo-J.apanese War. 'l'he 
proposals which Stalin then made .formed the ba sis .for the 
discussion at Yalta. 1 
Much criticism has been leveled at the fa ilure to 
invite Chiang Kai-shek to take part in the eo m..t'erence and to 
the stipulations in the treaty that he was not even to be 
informed of the terms dealing with China . Acheson explained 
his absenc~ as necessary _• due to Stalin's insistence that 
the Yalta Conference would deal mainly with the war in Eur-
ope. Keeping Chiang in ignorance was based on prior exper-
ience, for whatever was known in Chungking eventually 
reached the Japanese; Stalin was unwilling to risk disclo-
sure of his plans to Tokyo before his Asian forces were 
strengthened, 2 
1Ibid ., p . 3611. The only difference between Stalin's 
.first proposals and the final agreement was that Dairen was 
ma.de an international port rather than being leased · to 
Russia. The day after Roosevelt and Sta lin agreed to the 
terms, Churchill concurred. 
2
~ ., p . 882 . 
11 
After quoting from a book by Edward Stettinius 
relating how Roosevelt's death prevented him from report-
ing the Yalta terms to Ohian.g , Sen~tor H. Alexander Smith 
asserted that 11we did not play fair with our own ally'' and 
made China pay the price for Russia ' s entrance into the 
war. Again Acheson countere d that Russian help was believed 
necessary before an attack could b. made on Honshu "1 
Although the clause that claims of the Soviet Union in the 
Far ~ast should be 11unquestionably fulfilled" seemed to 
some to be a betrayal of China, Roosevelt had been convinced 
that the requirement of China's eventual concurrence had 
qualified this phrase. Accordin g to che~on, the terms of 
the agreement (which were, i11 his o~inion , in the long-term 
interest of China) had never been contested by Chiang. 2 
When the Generalis simo was notified of the Yalta Agr eement 
on June 15, 1945, he proceeded to draw up an arran gement 
wit the Soviet Union . 
Gen·eral Wedemeyer painted a different picture of 
Chi ang's reaction to Yalta . From personal conversations 
with Chiang he knew the shock and hurt felt by him because 
of the Crimean arrangements . 3 When questioned on t he sub-
ject of Chiang losing face, especially in . Manchuria, because 
of Ya.1 t .a, Acheson said he did not believe that this was so . 
He pointed to t he long time whic h it took Chiang's forces to 
l !!2M!•, p. 1871. 2 ~-.. PP• 1924 and 1881 . 
3New York Times, June 13, 1951. 
12 
reach Manchuria after the armistices he believed it would 
have l;leen impo$sible tor the iatio:nalists to have reached 
Manchuria at the end ot the war te ad.minister the surrender 
of ?00,000 armed Japanese and prevent the territory f'rom 
-falling into the hands 0£ the Rus.sians. 1 
A controversial provision o! the agre ement was the 
control given to Russia ever Dairen and Port Arthur. When 
Senator Hiekenlooper spoke of this as granting extraterri-
tori.al rights in violation of the Atlant ,ic Charter, Acheson 
admitted that we had had to t1se our efforts to obtain 
Cbiang•e -aoncurrence on this question. 2 When questioned by 
Hicken.looper en this subject again later in the hearings, . 
Acheson replied that he did not believe that China we..s 
deprived of the use of these ports at Yalta and that a coop-
erative relationship might bave been !ormed as it was in the. 
case of Dairen.3 
When Patrick Hurley spoke be.fore the investigating 
committees., he aroused .further controversy by maintaining 
that Roosevelt wa$ sick at Yalta and that tbe Agreement did 
not represent his belie.rs.. Accot'ding ta Burley, Roosevelt 
had commissioned hi m to try to soften or even set as -ide the 
Yalta Agreement. and to do this, had sent him to London and 
Moscow. By the time he reached Teheran. Roosevelt had died. 
Un&er orders .from President 'Fruman to eontmue, be met 
Stalin and discussed the Yalta Agreement with him. Admitt -ing 
1Milit,q Si.tuati,on i~ the Far East, PP• 18?1-?2. 
• . • £ ' • 
13 
that he left these meetings with the Russian leader over-
optimistic about the possibility of warding off ill e.ffeets 
resulting from a possible increase in Russian power, Hurley 
claimed that he might have been able to do something if the 
State Department had not intervened. He had made a dent in 
the armor of the British and Russians , but could. not per -
suade the State Department of any changes needed in the 
l Agreement . 
Stilwell and Hurley in China 
Much of the hearin gs was eoneern-$d with the Communist 
conquest of China . In 19'+4 General Joseph Stilwell, prin-
cipal .American officer in China, became convinced that if 
the forces of General Chiang Kai-shek were to be eff .ecti ve 
against the Japanese, they would have to be brought under 
American direeti'on . He also believed that Na.tionaljst 
forces which had be en withdrawn from the struggle against 
the Japan~se to fight the Communists should once again ta.lee 
the offensive against the .foreign enemy. 2 General Patrick 
Hurley was appointed personal representative o! President 
Roosevelt in ~ugust 1944- to adjust differences between 
General Stilwell and Cbjang Kai -shek. _, ___ , ________________________ _ 
l . Ibid ., PP• 2885-88 . 
-2Aecording to General Wedemeyer , the actual contribu-
tion of the Chinese Communists in · the struggle against Japan 
was limited. On the other hand, neither was the number o.f 
Nationalist troops occupied in fighting the Communists very 
large (ibid., pp . 2298 - 99) . Secretary Marshall gave a differ-
ent interpretation of Nationalist contributions; he thought 
the record showe~ Stilwel l's belief ln too great an involve-
ment of the Nationalists · against the Communists to be true 
(~ ., p . 460) . 
14 
According to Hurley, just as Chiang was about to 
accept the American proposals, he received a telegram from 
Roose velt. Considering this me.asage an ultimatum 1 the Gen-
eralissimo wrote an aide-memotre to the American president 
pointing out his differences with Stilwell and stating his 
belief that the Ameriean lacked milita:r·y judgment ., as was 
evident from his refusal to conduct a .full campaign in 
Burma . 1 He soon requested Stilwe11•s recall. 
After a visit to Molotov in Moscow1 Hurley was much 
· impressed with Russian sincerity and reported to Washington 
not only that the Soviets would welcome United States aid in 
the unification of China, but also that the Soviet Govern-
ment was not responsible for the internal developm ents of 
China. While discussing the problem of. Russo-Chinese rela-
tions with Chiang , Hurley gave the Chinese leader the impres-
sion that Russia would le ave Chinese affairs aloe. The 
ationalists could even negotiate with the Chinese Commurust 
Party, since it was a group without foreign entan glements. 2 
Because of this information on the independence of the Chi-
nese Communists from Moscow, Chiang did not feel it neces-
sary to adjust great ly his program to please the Communists; 
without Russian support they would have had to accept his 
After a meeting with Mao Tse- -tung, chief of the 
Chinese Communist Party, General Hurley brought back to 
1
~ •• pp. 2868-72. 2Ibid., PP• 2864-65. 
/ 
) 
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Chungkin g a .five-point program for sett>lement with the 
Communists . The Communists evidently hoped to use these 
negotiations to political advantage before eonsenting to 
military inte gration . The struggles between the National-
ists and the Communists for control of territory surrendered 
by the Japanese began after August 15, 1945. With American 
assistance, the Nationalists moved into Manchuria and were 
able to take over many cities and railroads . They were not, 
however , able to gain complete control of t he countryside . 
They ·had asked the Russians to delay their departure from 
Manchuria to enable Chiang•s forces to gather in the area . 
Later, when General Marshall was discussing an agr eement for 
a cease-fire between t he Nationalists and Communists in 1946, 
it was decided that the Nationalists were to move into Man-
churia. However, the Communists took advanta ge o.f t he .first 
1 opportunity they had to move into the vacuum . 
In his testimony General Marshall spoke of rumors 
that Soviet troops were removed f rom Manchuria in such a way 
that the domination by the Communists was a.ssured . 2 In dis-
cussing ways in which the growth of Chinese Communism could 
have been halted, General Wedemeyer testified t hat at th -e end 
of World War II he had wanted to put United States divisions 
in Manchuria to set up a Darrier against the Soviet Union, but 
that MacArthur had refused to make them available because of 
a probable need for them in the occupation of Japan . 3 
2 
~ . , PP• 696-9? . 
3New York Times, June 13, 1951 . 
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Sta te Department Officials in China 
Meanwhile some Foreign Service officers and others in 
China were reporting to the Department of otate that the 
Kuomintang was becoming steadily weaker , while the Commu-
nists were increasing in stren gth and receiving more and 
more popular support . The sharpest cfti t i eism of State 
Department personnel was read by Senator Smith from Hurley•s 
lette~ of resignation in 1945 in which he alleged: 
While these objectives had the sup port of the 
President and the Secretary of Sta te it is nose-
er et tha t the American policy in China did not have 
the support of all the eareer men in t he State De-
partment . The professional Foreign Service men 
sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and 
the imperialist bloc of nations whose fOlicy it was 
to keep China . divided against hersel.f. 
In his testimony General Wedemeyer agreed that his 
four political. advisers--John Davies , John Emerson, Raymond 
Ludden , and J.ohn Service--submi tted me-moranda which invari-
ably criticised the Nationalist Government and praised the 
~ommunist regime. 2 Be admitted, :t0wt.ve-r, that the career 
men seemed to be very intelligent and exp erienced, and when 
questioned on this point by Senator Russell, oonceded that 
they were not any more critical of the Chinese Nationalists 
than he had been in a speech in 1947 before a Senate oom-
mittee,.3 
In his testimony before t he Committees, General 
Hurley reported rinding the career men actually passing 
______________________________ ,_ 
1Military Si~uati9.n in the F~r East, p. 18?5. 
2 Ibi£., pp . 2401 and 2496. 3~-• p. 2524. 
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secret information to the armed Chinese Communists. He 
quoted a report of John Service to General Stilwell 1 which 
Hurley had obtained .from a Chinese Communist, in which the 
Foreign Service officer had expressed the opinion that the 
United States should take a more realistic line in China 
and realize tihat the Kuominte.ng was in a crisis with its 
prestige at its lowest point . Nevertheless, Service' 
most extreme statement in this report seems to have been 
that the °Kuomintang is dependent upon America for sur-
vival, but we are in no ways dependent on the Kuomintang . ~1 
When confronted with ·Rurley's statements on the 
Communist leanings o.f those in the State Department's ser-
vice in China, Dean Acheson recalled extended hearings 
be.fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this ques-
tion . He remarked that he thought the view then put for-
ward. wa that General · Hurley was mistaken in what he s·aid ., 2 
Were American personnel aware ef the nature of the 
Chinese Communists during and atter the war? Senator Know-
land maintained t ba t they were not; he quoted from a report 
of Raymond Ludden that "the so-called Communists are 
1Ibid . , pp. 2911-12. General Hurley later accus d 
Servieeorbeing pro-Communist and of delivering important 
Stat Department documents to Philip Jaffe, editor o! the 
magazine Amerasia and allegedly a Communist . Service bad 
once suggested that America he prepared te arm any Chinese 
forces which could be used effeotively 7 since the American 
purpose was to maintain a degree o.f !lexibility which would 
permit cooperation with anyone furthering a "united, demo-
cratic, friendly China <!!?.li•• pp., 2929-,0) . " 
2 illg . , p. 1875 •. 
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agrarian re:formers of a mild democratic stripe more than 
anything else. Acheson maintained that the first 
concern o:f the American personnel in China was in serving 
United States interests and that during the war their .first 
effort had been to try to bring all forces in China together 
to .fight the Japa:nese" He knew of no State Department peo-
ple who considered the Communists merely agrarian ref'ormers; 
on the contrary, in their rep orts they referred to Moscow 
training and to the Marxist rigidity of the Chinese Commu~ 
nists . 2 General Barr testified that he did not find any 
State Departmen t personnel dealing with the Communists, at 
least when he was in Cbin-a.3 
After General Hurley• s diatribe against the "Communists" 
in the State Departm ent and his avowal that he had always 
realized the dangers of Communism, Senator McMahon pointed 
to several instances when Hurley had advocated appeasement . 
In a speech on November 29, 1945 1 the Genera l bad stated 
/ 
that the "only di.fferenee between the Chinese Communists 
and Oklahoma Republicans is that the Oklahoma Republicans 
l 2 . · 
~•, P• 892 . !MS.,, PP • 1858 and 18?►?4 . 
3rbid •• pp . 2971-?2 . All those appearing before the 
two comm'Ittees main tained that they had always known the 
nature of Chinese Communism. Answering Sen . Bridges' query 
on whether the War Dept. had not reported in 1945 1that the 
Communists were definitely not agrarian reformers, Sec . 
Marshall testified that 1hen he went to China and looked 
over the situation, he had no doubt but that the 1eadership 
of the gr oup was Marxian Communist , especially after seeing 
a hugh picture of Lenin and Stal in at Yennan,.. He recalled 
Chou-En-Lai protesting in 1946 against some Chinese dragging 
Stalin's portrait through the mud (_!lli ., pp, 377•? 8 ) . 
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aren't armedo" Hurley de£ended himself by saying that . 
McMahon had quoted out of context; what he had said referred 
to a period while the war was still going on and when it 
was neces sary to get the Chinese Communists and Nationalists 
together against Japan. 1 However, the war and the need for 
uniting against Japan were over at the -time Hurley made this 
speech in the latter half of 1945. 
The Marshall and Wedemeyer Reports 
In a general statement on China at the beginning o! 
his testimony, Secretary of State Acheson stres s ed the fact 
that American aid, could not of itself insure the survival 
of <it. reci -pient government , that the power of decision rested 
with the government and with the people. In pointing out 
moments o.f decision in China after the war, he spoke first 
of the task ef extending the authority of the Chim~se 
throughout the nat .~on. In his report o.f November 1945 Gen-
eral Wedemeyer protested that the staff of the Generalissimo 
had not fully a_preciated the importance of logistic and 
transportation support o! the troops in Manchuria. Wede-
meyer had also advised Chiang to concentrate on stabilizing 
the .situation in eouth Cina through reform and, with the 
assistance of . foreign administrators and technicians, to 
try to concentrate his military efforts in North China, not 
Manchuria, reaching an agreement with the Communists in the 
area. 2 Report ing that the Nationalist Government was 
1New York Tim~s , June 22, 1951. 
2Military Situation in the Far Eas~, PP• 1840-42. 
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completely unprepared for the occupation of Manchuria in 
the .face of Communist opposition, General Wedemeyer further 
su g';;ested th at the Nationalists would have to come to an 
agreement with the Russians on their respective positions 
in Manchuria. . 1 
When open civil war broke out between the Communists 
and Nationalists in North China in 1945, there we.ve several 
positions the United States could have ta.ken. In his testi-
mony ean Acheson said t hat one ~ction could ha'V'e be en for 
America to pull out completely. However,, this might have 
permitted the Japanese.- who still had consider&ble influence . 
-Bnd strength in the area, to take over the divided country . 
The alternative of contributing unlimited aid to help the 
Nationalists was contrary to the wishes of the American 
people. Thus Washin gton chose a compromise position of 
giving important eco~omic aid to the Chinese Nationalists. 
and offering assistance L working out an agreement. 2 
General Marshall was to go to China to implement the 
American policy as it had been outlined in a memorandum to 
t he ar Depar t ment by Secretary of s tate Byrnes . The memo-
r andu m stated that our long-range goal was "the development 
of a stron g ~ united, and democratic China.,. In order to 
furt her this development. dissident elements in the country 
shou.ld napproach the settlement of their differences with 
a genuine willin gness to compromise." Chiang Kai-shek's 
1Ibid . , P• 461., This was on Povember 20, 194-5 . 
2 I bid • • p . l 8 l}2 • 
-
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government afforded the most satisfaetory base for a demo-
cracy, although it should be broadened to include repre-
sentatives o! other organized groups in China .. 1 
In his instructions, Truman asked Marshall to try to 
persuade the Chinese Government to oall a national confer-
ence of representatives of major political elements to bring 
ab-out the unification o.f China. . He mentioned that a People's 
Consultative Council (POC) which included the Chinese Commu-
nists was already in session in Chungking . The President 
gave Marshall permission to speak with the utmost frankness 
to Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders to .the effect t hat "a 
China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be con-
sidered realistically as a proper plaee .for American assist-
ance along the lines enumerated.n 2 
Coalition Government in China 
During his tastinioey Marshall admitted that he had 
had only a vague concept of the changes of government in 
China or of the single party as conceived by Sun Yat -sen. 
He ~cquired most of his working knowfedge on these subjects 
dur i ng his flight to Chin .a.. 3 Soon after his arrivals the 
Ameriea.n representative was successful in securing an 
agreem~nt calling .for the cessation of hostilities . To su-
pervi.se the execution of this Truce Agreement ·of January 1, 
1Ibid., pp. 3184--85. Marshall testified t .hat Byrnes, 
Undersecretary o:f State Acheson and John Carter Vincent; 
head of the China group in the .State Department; had proba-
bl1 drawn up this report ., 
2
~ ., P• 3185. 3Ibid., p . 548. 
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1946, . representatives of the Chinese Communist Party t the 
Nationalist Government, and of the United States set up · 
headquarters in Pe·iping. Truce teams composed of the three 
groups were also to be sent into th-e field tbo make .sure the 
terms were carried out. The People's Consultative Council 
adopted resolutions calling for the reconstr uct ion of the 
State Council and for the convocation on May 4 1 1946, of a 
National Assembly to adopt a perm.anent constitution. 1 
Much discussion in the hearin t:s centered about who 
Euc·actly had advocated t he formation o.f a coalition govern-
ment . Marshall said th i!lt the first United States suggestion 
for Communist participation in the Government -was made by 
.Ambassador Clarence Gauss when in 1944 he sug gcs.rted to Chiang 
the possibility of a war council. 2 In November of that yeax 
General Hurley took active measures to he lp .form the coali-
tion . ; 
One minor argument of the hearings was whether a tele-
gram approved by MacArthur, Wedemeyer, and Raymond A. 
Spruance , commander of the 5th Fleet, indicated support o.f a 
coalition g.overnment. Acheson read the tele gram, whic h out-
lined moves the military advocated in China and then suggest-
ed that American assistance to China 0 be made available as 
basis !or negotitation [sicl by the American Ambassador to 
1Harold Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics . in the Post--war 
Period; (New York: .Appleton, dentury::Cro.ft.s. Inc., 1956), 
pp'. roa...09. 
2
~i!J::t~r:;y Situation in the Far East _1 P• .544. 
3,Ibid ., p.-. 1919. Testimony 0£ Dean Acheson. 
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bring together and e.f!eet a compromise between the major 
opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic 
China,. •tl MacArthur responded that it was beyon be lie£ to 
inter support ox a coalition government from one small para-
graph attached. to a technical report. As proo:r that this 
tele gram was not -viewed in 1946 as a support of a coalition 
government , MacArthur- telegraphed the Committees that 
~arsha ll had not Illentioned the tele gra:m when the two m.-et soon 
thereafter . According to MacArthur -• the e.f.t'ect of the 
Ma.r$hall mission (to uee American assistanee as a. weapon to 
force an alliance with the Communists) was the exa~t oppo-
site o! the id.ea$ of the MacArthur- Wedemeyer- Spruan ee tele-
gram.2 
General Wedemeyer also asserted that the paragraph was 
taken out oL context from a m~ss age attemptin g to strengthen 
the position of the Nationa list Government ; especially in 
enabling it to fill any vacuum left by t he withdrawal of 
Japane-se troops .3 Unde.r further examination by Democratic 
' 
Senat ors, Wedemeyer aeknowledg$d that be had wanted some 
kind o! arran gem~nt between the Co~unists and Nat ionalists 
to rehabilitate the ¢ountry. Alth ough this was almost ex-
act.J.y the purpose which the administration gave as Marshall's 
m:tssion , it would seem that the Presi4en t•s directive to 
Marshall went much further, especially in advocating the 
use of economic persuasion. 
l 2 Ibid., pp . 2247-4-8. !,bid.• p . 2249. 
3 Ibid . , pp. 2297-98. 
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Did Russia .favor a Eappr_2ehatnent of the National• 
ists and the Communists? Senator Bridges read part o! a 
military intelligence report of 1945 which st ated t ha t 
there were reports of Russia wanting a coalition govern-
ment established in order that North China and Manchuria 
might eventually become the exclusive terrain of th-e Chi-
nese Communists• who could gain t he upper hand. C-onsi·der-
ing the meth◊ds which might be used to bring the Kuomin• 
tang and the Communists together after the war• t he report 
m~ntioned the Nationalist-sponsored Genl?ral Assembly idea 
and the Communist-sponsored idea of a eoalition government, 
·, 
an idea which Chiang bad already rejected. The American 
- military report coneluded • however, that peace in the Far 
E$.St depended on the unity of China to keep it out Q! Rus-
sian control .. When previously questioned on this report in 
1949• Dean Acheson had .stated that this verai.on had been 
written as a summary oft-he coUtplet(t report by an o.t.ficer 
who had worked on the original. fhe summary did not re-
.fleet the tenor oi the report as a whole and had 'been with,,.-
drawn by the military intelligence division. NevertheleJJs, 
i.n the meantime it had been circulated among Congressmen 
by Representative Juda. 1 
According to Dean Acheson• milita?;"y men assented to 
Marshall's e!'fort at mediation aa the only hope tor ti'fation-
ali.st oo.ntrol over North China and Maneburia. When the 
Nationalists attempted to maintain and improve their 
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position in Manchuria by force, the American view was that 
they would fail. The only question was how disastrous the 
failure would be. 1.ro mitigate the e.f.fects of military de-
feat , the United States advised them not to take indefens-
ible positions . 1 
In July 1947 General Albert edemeyer was sent to 
China to advise the Nationalists . In a report to Washing -
ton, he stressed the dan ger of Manchuria falling into Soviet 
hands, which would lead ultimately to a Communist-dominated 
China. He sug gested that China should promptly request 
United Nations action to bring about a cessation of hostili-
ties and the creation of a collective trusteeship composed 
or, perhaps , China, the Soviet Union ,_ the United States , Great 
Bri t ain, and Franoe . 2 Marshall .pointed out that Wedemeyer 
proposed to place the Chinese problem be!ore the United 
Nations; however. the United tates was not eonvineed that 
United Nations jurisdiction extended to events within a 
particular country . Also , the proposal for a trusteeship 
would have greatly embarrassed Chiang , who had stated many 
times that he would have nothing to do with any settlement 
which included the Russians or British as trustees.3 In 
his testimony General edemeyer asserted that he had made 
these proposals to save as much as possible for China, 
since at the time of bis report the United States, had just 
1 2 rug . , p . 2029 . !_lli . , pp. 2295-2308 . 
3 Ibid ., PP• 372 and 54?. 
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played down t he capabilities of the Nationalists and t hus 
had hurt them deeply . 1 
American Aid to the Nationalists 
During the hearings there were many ar guments on t he 
questi -on of aid to China. Acheson asserted th at t he Unite d 
States sent conside r able equipment to t he Chinese Nati ,onal .. 
ists after the Japanese surrender; a large part of this 
consisted of ammunition and arms le.ft by the marines when 
t hey withdrew from the mainland . When Senator Hieke nlooper 
suggested t hat much of the equipment was useless for mili-
tary operations, Acheson said that t his was not correct;. 
neve r theless, he did admit that some of the planes turned 
over mi ght have been cargo planes rather t han military ones. 2 
Wedemeyer sug gested that after his mi s si on he had 
advocated sendi.ng tailitary and economic advi .s~rs to China. 
as well as moral and mate r ial aid. Re did. not believe,. 
however, that t he NationalistS. lost China because of lack 
of equip ment . , Ke!auver pointed out that t he Wedemeyer 
paper had recom nended t ~at China inform the Unj.ted Nation .s 
of its reque s t for i ncreased mat ·erials and advisers. ']}o 
the Senator this did not seem to be a direct reoommendation 
!or aid . 4 Acheson had earlier said that alth ough 'edemeyer 
had not positively su gg ested atmding aid, it was possible 
to read th at in ·to his report. 
1wew York Times. June 12, 1951. 
2
~ilitarl ~!!uation in the Far East• P• 188?~ 
3Ibid.,, p •. 2}29 . 4~., PP • 2044-45. 
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In speaking o! assistance sent up to the t -ime of the 
Marshall mission, Senator Knowland read a paragraph written 
on October 11, . 1945. which stipulated that no weapons w-e.re 
t0 be used in .fighting a civil war,. Acheson's answer was 
that there WS.$ a. strang belie.f t hat the National .ists w~re 
too w~ak to sett.le their problen,ts by f.oroe and that it was 
preferabl e to neg ·otiate. When g_u~stioned on a s,ta1te.ment 
made by President Truman in Dec&mber or 1946 .that material 
given to China did not include war material , Acheson -ex .... 
plained .that t.his wa$ duri ng a tim.e when an embal"go against 
sending war goods to China was in efieet (!rozn August 1946 
t -o May 194?). 1 
Congress later appropriated 3400 ,J:>Oo,ooo for mill tary 
support. When Senator Bridges eha?J>ged the State Depart-
ment with O•pposins a larger approp ·r·iation by the Eightieth 
Congress,. Marshal l replied that the Administration bad ac-
tually request .ad $5'?5100o.ooo-.2 '11he !ormer Secretary ot 
State had earlier explai ned that much of the dit'iio-ul-ty was 
in getting support f:t•om the various financial egitnei~s with 
which he had to de-al. As he reoe.ll.ed . · edemeye.r • s estimate 
0£ about 10,000 o.ffi -cers and technieiana need5d to ov·er .s~e 
and direct the &peraticn in China• Marshall asserte-d that 
the Go.vernment could not have committed itself to s¢nding 
so many men. An indication of why it was impossible for 
the military to send a large force te the Pt.a.r East was that 
----------------------------
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there were only one and a third divisions in the entire 
Unit-ed States. 1 
Several times Senator Hiek:enlooper brought up a state• 
men.t by Marshall in 194? that troops were sent to .North 
China with only two rounds of ammunition per gun . Acheson 
replied that this statement indicated only that troops w'6nt 
to North China with l ittle ammunition, not t hat they bad 
literally two rounds per gun . Even i.f more equipment had 
been supplied, it ls not certain that it would llave been 
effectively used . One of the great weaknesses o! the Chi-
nese Nationalists :was their eomplete ignorance of logistics 
and supply . According to General Collins, the United 
States had .fully equipped ten Chinese divisions with Amer-
ican equipment, all of which was loat. 2 
To·ward ·the end of the hearings there were two oppos-. 
ing points 0£ view presented on the adequacy of American 
aid in 1948 . Viee Admiral Badger, Naval Commandei:' in the 
-Far East after World War II , asserted that the Truman ad-
ministration• s ef.forts to aid China w-er~ haphazard, al though 
.generous . Refusing to accuse an.1 speei.f'ie persont he ob-
serv ed that what had ear l ier been an even chance o.t sav.ing 
North China was los-t; in 1948 by a fiVEf-month delay in send-
ing American arms • .3 He also proclaimed that the ten per 
cent of our equipment whi.eh did reach Chiang was of little 
1 lo1d . t P • 465.. 2~. 1 pp . 1888 and 122; ~ 
3Nt:tw .Xork Times, June 20, 1951. 
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or no use. 1 In the same vein, General Wedemeyer testified 
that much of the equipment was of no more value than scrap 
iron because the Chinese had no use at that time for such 
things as road graders. 2 
General Barr, head of our military mission to China 
in 1948, refuted Badger. Alle ging that no amount of wea-
pons could have saved the Chinese Commander, he believed 
that the Nationalist Government lost to the Communists be-
cause of its own ineptitude and corrupt .ion . The Nati onal-
ists had exag gerated the ineffectiveness of weapons sent 
them, while · missing parts were quickly replaced . within two 
or three days . General Barr even accused Badger 0£ con-
tributing to the,delay in shipping arms by failing to make 
requisitions~ What arms t he Nat ionalists did receive, they 
forfeited whenever they lost a battle, in the end leaving 
the Communists with a greater supply of American-made wea-
pons than they themselves had .3 
China White Pap er 
When it became evident in 1949 that the Nationalists 
were going to lose China, the Department of State prepared 
a paper explaining the situation, known as t he China tlhite 
Pape •4 Acheson testified that he recommended t he 
------------------------------1Ibid., June 21, 1951. 
--
2Milit@£? s ituation in the Far Eas~ , P• 2330. 
3william s . White, 11General Barr Defends U.S. China 
Policy, Q New York Times, June 23, 1951. 
4united States Relations with China, Publication 
3573, Far Eastern Series 30, 1949. 
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publication . of this paper to let the American people know 
the facts. In this way they would not be so tho.roughly 
shocked should the Nat;ionalist Government fall. . The ne-
cessity Qi preparing the public for this possibility out-
wei sh ed any harm which might result .for the l'Zati<'malists 
if their w.eakriesses were revealed. .Acheson pointed out 
that Chian g had already been driven out of !iorthern China 
to Canton, which was also ab-out to tall; consequently, pub-
lication of the White Paper could no longer have had a 
great effect on Chiang •s fate . 1 
Former Secretary o.f Defense Louis Johnson testified 
that he had argued in vain against the issuance of the re-
port, since it s-een1ed to be a deliberate effort by Acheson 
to destroy the Nationa list regime. He also asserted that 
the paper had originally contained military inaccuracies, 
later corrected; and oth r shortcomin gs which remained in 
the paper._ He asked what the purpose of t he paper was if 
not to destroy the Nation alist Government . 2 Acheson main-
tained, however , that nothing short of unlimited American 
eeonomie and military aid, including the use of our own 
troops; coul .d hav e maintained the Nationalists in South 
China in 1949. In a letter of that year the Secretary of 
State.had asserted that this country had tried to influence 
the forces bringing the Communists to power, but could not 
do so. He denied Senator Knowland • s accusation that this 
. .. .. .. 
1}:!ilitat"y Situatiop in the Far _East , pp. 1?69-?0. 
2 Ibid •• p . 1867. 
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was a defeatist attitud e compared with our stand in Greece, 
!or the circumstances in China were quite different . 1 
In reporting the discussion on the "China White 
Paper," James Reston ·noted that the outcry which followed its 
publication led us to maintain relations with the Formosan 
Government and to consider sending a mj_litary mission to it. 2 
evertheless , when the "dust settled 11 in China in 1949, Com-
munists were in power and the scene was set for conflict in 
the nearby Korean peninsu la.' 
rom the discussions on China in the hearin gs, the 
writer of this paper concludes that it was easy enou h for 
the Republicans· to point out in retrospect supposed inade-
quacies in the administration's policies . At the end of 
World War II, the Americ n people were in no mood to send 
, more troops to China. If, as Marshal l had suggested, Chiang 
had initiated reforms, }ao Tse-tung's program of land reforms 
would not have won him such powerful support rom the 
peasants . When the cabinet decided to send Marshall to 
1
~ ., p . 1803. In bis testimony Marshall agreed 
with·Acheson on t he difficulty of supporting Chiang (ibid ., 
p . 48?) . Wedemeyer testified that the Nationalists couici 
have he ld the Yangtze with broomsticks if they had had more 
spirit and less corruption, although he complained that our 
lack o.f moral support and · our overemphasis on his weaknes s 
harmed Chiang(~ ., pp . 2327-28). 
2New York Ti!!.!fil!, June 5, 1951. 
3Aeheson explained his use in 194-9 of the "dust 
se ttling" term as meaning that he could not see what the 
out c ome in China would be until the situation had become 
clear ( flilitary Sit~ation in t ~e Par East, p . 1?26) • 
... 
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conciliate the warring factions in China, it was because 
there se med no other alternative to thos e of complete 
withdrawal or all-out help for a full-scale war. 
Few saw the importance of the Communist Chi nese at 
the end of the war . Indeed, :Republicans could have at-
tacked 'edemeyer or Hurley, who had no effective solution 
in 1946, although thi would not have lad the impact on 
the public which criticizing the State Department did. 
In short, post-war China was an area where neither the 
military nor the civilian could formulate a policy which 
would work to our advantage , because they could not work 
togeter with the knowledge that the American people would 
back any decision , whatever it might be . 
CHAPTER III 
THE KOREAN WAR 
Postwar Korea 
After World Wa:r II both the Republic of Korea, estab-
lished in the South under the sponsorship of the United 
Nations, and the Democratic People ' s Republic of Korea in 
the North claimed to be the sovereign government 0£ all of 
Korea . At a conference in 1945 a four-power international 
trusteeship was seen as a solution to the problem of Korea . 
The Joint Commission established in 1946 to set up a govern ... 
men~ could find no wa:y to operate, since the Russians would 
not agree to the full democracy advocated by the Americans . 
When no way could be found out of the ensuing impasse, the 
United.States took the question of Korean independence to 
the United Nations . The Soviet Union proposed the simul-
taneous withdrawal of military forces of the occupying 
powers . This idea was opposed by the United States, hich 
knew that the Russians had formed a solidly Communist gov-
ernment and army in North Korea . The General Assembly 
rejected the Soviet proposal, but passed a resolution 
authorizing a Commission on Korea to use its good offices 
to bring about unification of the country and an inte-
gration of Korean farces . Ho~ever, when the Commission 
. ..,3 
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decided to contact leading persons in North Korea to try 
to effectuate a settlement, it was unsuccessful, and in the 
South Sj,~ngman .Rhee was unwilling that the United Nations 
group make _sug 3estions on the development or ·a more repre-
sent at ive government . 1 
.The ~Tnited Nations requested Americans and Russians 
to evacuate their troops irom Korea. The .Americans agreed 
to do so. The Joint Chiefs of .ta.ff believed that the 
troops were needed elsewhere., 2 and some officers, includ-
ing Genera l MacArthur, did not consider the situation in 
Korea particularly threatening at this time.3 By remuv:!.ng 
1Leland Goodrich, Kore : A Studz of U.S . Policy in 
the United Nations, Counc!ron Foreign Relations• New York1 1956, pp . ?~-76. 
2Militarz Situation in the Far Easti p. 1811 . Testi-
mony of Dean Acheson . George Marshall te st ified that the 
Joint Chie.fs of Staff found it d.;1.fficult to fully guard the 
airstrips in Alaska, while the u. s . occupation force in 
Japan was at only sixty per cent of strength (ibid., p. 382). 
-
3!bid., pp. 2167-68 . Some warninge were given , never-
theless, of the danger in Korea. According to Sen . Harry 
F. Byrd , Lt. Gen . John Hodges,. commat1_der of t he occupation 
forces, had declared before the Armed Servi ces Committee in 
February 194? that under conditions existing at the time 
the North Koreans w-0uld dominate South Koreans ii' the U. s. 
troops were to withdraw (ib~ ;' p . 2008). After his 194? 
trip to China, General Wedemeyer was i nstr ucted to proc feed 
to Korea and to report on conditions there. He recommended 
that the United States organize a..d equip a South Korean 
scout force to resist any attack .from the North, for unless 
.America gave assistance, a rorth Korean occup tion of the 
whole peninsula could be predicted (ibid., p . 1988). 'h is 
part of tbe 194? 1edemeyer report wabOt made public, &Ceo 
cording to Se cretary of State Acheson; because certain 
statements therein might have caused a break of harmony :u, 
certain quarters (ibid., p . 1987). Acheson maintained, 
however, that General Wedemeyer had agreed to the de cision 
to withdraw on the basis of a need for economy. 
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our army we could hope to prevent a stru ggle in the penin-
sula* which was str ate gically a poor place to .fi ght. 1 
Also, pressure for a spe edy withdrawal was exerted by South 
2 Korea ♦. 
The United Nations Commiss ion reported an evacuation 
of all Unite d States forces by Jul y 27, 1949, except !or a 
Military Advisory Group of about five hundred men and of-
ficers. The Commission was unable to verify whether the 
Soviet Union had carried out its announced withdra wal by 
the end of 1948. ' o les s en the possibility of military con-
flict between t he two s ections of the country, the United 
Nations planned t he use of trained observers alon g the fron-
tier betwe en t he North and t he oouth. 3 
The United States was more interested in strengthen-
in g South Korea eaono.mically t han militarily. ccording to 
General ·MacArthur, American troops had left sufficient 
equipment be llind to stop r·orth Korean security forces; it 
was not, hoiever, suf f icient to stop a ·well-equipped at-
4 tacking force. In January 1950 our military mis sion 
si gned an agre ement with Korea for almost 11,000.000 
worth of military goods, and at t he time of the June inva-
sion a lar ee part of the equipment was bein g shipped. 
Still, since t he equip ment had to come from new procurement 
~_!bid., p. 7.53'.,, General .Bradleyi s testimony. 
z!liiid,, p. 243,. MacArthur• s testimony ·. 
-
3coodrich, pp. 78-79. 
~Militarl._§_lluation in the Far East, p. 2L1-3. 
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or from partly depleted stocks, there was some difficulty 
i n getting the program und er way, and neither of these 
sources could have been satisfactorily tapped in the ninety 
days between the working out of the program in March and 
the June invasion. 1 
The United States had been criticized both for not 
making clear what it. would do if an attack from .North Korea 
occurred and also for its failure to give adequate military 
support to the Pr esident of South Korea . 2 Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson was ac cused of revealing the indecision 
of the United States in reference to the protection of Ko-
rea. in a .speech before the National Press Club on January 
12, 1950. Mr. Acheson emphasized that in this speech he 
had been speaking mainly of areas where United States troops 
were stationed and which they had to defend . In referring 
to other re gions of the Paci.fie, he had stated that no one 
could guarantee t hese areas against military attack, but 
t ha t th} initial reliance !or defence must rest on the in-
di genous people . These areas could then count on "the- com• 
mitments oft e entire civilized world under the Charter of 
the United rations which so far has not proved a weak reed 
1Ibid., pp. 1837 and 1993~34, Acheson•s testi mony. 
--2In view of the poor training and morale of the South 
Koreans, it remained questionable from evidence presented 
in t he hearings whether more aid would have helped the Ko-
reans (ibid., pp . 243 1 2114-15, 3384-85) . Senator Greene 
poi ntedtc)the fear of some authorities that President Rhee 
would use armaments te amount an attack against North Korea 
as a reason for not tendering more aid (!!?!2,., p. 2114) . 
37 
to lean on by any people who are determined to protect 
their independence against outside aggression . 111 
Dean Acheson quoted parts of a speach by John Foster 
Dulles, then Con$ultant to the Secretary of State , before 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on June 19, 
·1950. to show that we never adopted a policy of abandoning 
Korea . After telling the Koreans that "the American people · 
give you their support, both moral and material, consistent 
with your own respect and primary dependence upon your own 
efforts , u Dulles emphasized that the United Nations nrequires 
all nations to refrain from any threat . or use .of force 
against your territorial inte grity or political independ-
ence ., 02 It is probable, however., that ? orth Koreans were 
already preparing to attack and that this speech came too 
late to be a deterrent factor . 
Invasion of South Korea 
It was five days after Dulles ,' speech that the North 
,.•' 
Koreans attacked . lhat evidence had there been that this 
invasion would occur? The Far 'astern Command, the Central 
1Ibid ., pp . 1?40-41 and 1811-12 . In their book The 
General-and the President and the Future of American Jor-
ei~n :Polle~ (Ifew York : Farrarr Straus , anci Young, 'Ig51) p . Io , Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. express 
the opinion that Aeheson's statements were .foolish in in-
viting aggression. On the other hand , alber _Millis thinks 
that Acheson could hardly have stated otherwise, sina~ 
.American troops had been withdrawn £rom Korea (~sand the 
State : Civil-Militar Elements · in N,tional PoliC: New 
ork: Council on ·•o"" eign Relations, 1956 , p. 260 . 
2Military Situation in t he Far East, PP• 2020-22. 
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Intelli gence Agency, and other grou ps had reported the pos-
sibility of an offensive, but one die not seem imminent . 
The administration believed that since the Communists had 
far from exhausted the possibilities of guerilla and psy-
. . 
cbological war.fare, political pressure , and intimidation as 
means of obt ai ni ng their objectives, they would probably 
continue these methods instead of undertakin g overt mili-
tary action . Secretary Acheson quoted a report of March 10, 
1950, from General MacArthur . - According to this report, 
the Soviet Union would probably attempt to take over part s 
of South east Asia which were less well guarded before mov:ing 
against Soubh Korea . The report did st ate, however ., that 
if checke d in t hese areas , Russia might divert a large sha:-e 
of its at t ention to South Korea and might even invade this 
territory . When Senator Bridges claimed t hat this was a 
definite warning of tbe coming -attack , A.ehe-son responded 
that the Far East Command had not believed the statement and 
had reported that there would be no civil war in Korea that 
summer. Also, previous unfulfilled reports Oll' invasion 
had been received as early as October 1949 . 1 
About 9:30 P . M. on June 24 Ambassador John Muccio 
informed Washington that North Korean forces had invaded 
South Korea . On the morning of the twenty - fifth , Ambassa -
dor to the United Nations Ernest Gross requested a meeting 
of the Security Council. With Russia absent in protest 
-----------------------------1
~ . , PP • 230-31 . 
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over Uni t ed Nations ve.fusal to reco gnize a representative 
of Communist China, the Council adopted a resolution de-
claring that a breach 0£ the peace had occurred and call-
ing for the North Koreans to cease hostilities. 1 The reso-
lution also ealled on all members to render ev ery as sist -
ance to th e United Nati ons and to refrain from assisting 
the North Koreans . 2 
Some Senators tried to determine whether Pr esi dent 
Truman had made the decision to commit. ground troops to 
enter the Korean fi ghting only after careful deliberations 
with his advisers. Testimony showed that t he Secretary of 
Stane, Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
others were pr e se nt at the Blair House meetin gs when deci-
sions on how to meet the threat in Korea were made . 3 As 
Secretary ~f Defense Joh ns on testi!ied, the military did 
not recommend goin g into Korea, but neither did any o! the 
officials oppose doing so when they had the ch ance .4 Nei-
t her did me!Ilbers of Co . ress when they knew what American 
actio would be. 
At a Blair House meeting on June 26 it was decided to 
move th e Sevent h Fleet to t he Formosa Straits, to use naval 
and air .forces t,o protect t he evacuation of American na-
tionals, and to furnish arms to the Republic of Korea . The 
1ooo drich, p . 106, and Militacy Situation in t he Far 
East, p . 1211 . Marshall read this resolution to the Senat ors . 
2!lli., P• 361. 3~ . , PP• 2572-7 6 ,. 
4
~., p . 2585; cf, Bradley ' s testi mony, pp . 933•34 . 
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next day President Truman reported to Congress that follow-
ing the Security Council call upon members to render every 
assistance in a.topping the aggression, he ha.d ordered United 
States air and sea units to give Korean troops cover and 
support. 1 On the twenty-ninth o! June authorization was 
given to extend operations to North Korea; but only i.f this. 
were necessary to .~omplete the mission ' of clearing the 
South of l orth Koreans ·and of retaining a port and ai~ base 
2 in the area of Pusan . 
General MacArthur informed the Joint Chie.fs of Staff 
of the confusion or th South Korean Army, which he ob-
served on a reconnaissanee of the Korean battle area . Much 
equipment had been abandoned or lost . It was possible that 
the North Koreans could break through . In fact, the hold-
ing of the Han River line could be assured only by using 
ground troops . 3 There.fore, 'General MacArthur advised the 
1Ibid., pp . 933~'4, 991- 92. In reality, the ecurity 
Council-ala not meet until several hours a!'ter Truman ' s 
announcement, an-d it was still later when it adopted a u.s. 
draft resolution recommending assistance . 
. 
2
rbid . , p . 536-, Marshall's testimony; also, P• 934-, 
Bradley~estimony . 
3
~t, p . 1112 and 235. General ' edemeyer testif'ied 
that be would not have sent ground troops into Korea; never -
theless, he is careful to point out that he migpt not be 
able to pass a competent judgment on this question, as he 
had not been in Korea and did not know all the details 
(ibid . , pp . 2307-08) , On the other . hand, he maintained 
t!i'irt he 'government. was "absolutely correct in taking a£firm -
ative steps ainst the advance ot communism . e had to do 
it some place and the time was already overdue, • • •• (fil9_. 
p . 2315) . u Admiral Sherman also stated that he thought 
the d_eci.sion to commit ground troops was sound , altho ug h he 
had had apprehensione at the time (!R~•• P• 1651) . 
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Joint Chiefs• i.f so authorized, that he intended to move 
an American regimental combat _ team to the combat area as 
the nuoleus .for a poe -sible build up et two di visions fr-om 
Japan . Tbis would make an early offensive feasible in 
accordance with his mission ot clearing South Korea ot 
Nor hern troops. 1 
Collective Aotion in Korea 
On July? the action of sending ground troops into 
Korea was affirmed by the United Nations Security Couneil . 
It recommended that members o:f the United Nations make 
forces available to a unified command under American direc• 
tion to carry out the June 25 and 2? resolutions . .ao-
Arthur was designa.te4 as the military leader . Although bis 
position was created by the world body, the appointee eon-
sidered his connection with the United Nati.on.a as largely 
nominal, since the entire control of his command came from 
the Chiefs of Staff and even his reports were sent to the 
State and Dei'ense Departments be!ore being .forwarded to the 
United Nations. According to MacArthur, he had no direct 
connection with the United nations.2 
In outlining military strategy at the beginning of 
the Korean War, MacArthur mentioned that it was problemat-
1cal at first whether an y remnants or the South Korean 
Army eould be saved. At the time o:t the invasion, the 
l 
~--
p . 1112, Bradley's testimony . 
2 Ibid., P• 10 . 
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Joint Chiefs had underestimated the number, equipment, and 
ability of the North Koreans . 1 While South Koreans were 
burdened be-cause of logistic mis takes in the arrangement 
of supplies and quipm nt close to the thirty-:eigbth par-
allel, the in ~aders had been trained and disciplined well. 2 
To aid the South Koreans , America could contri bute immed~ 
iately only tbe .four divisions o! the Eighth Army in Japan. 
MacArthur believed these troops to be as good as any with-
out combat experience, in spite of some defects in organ-
isation,which could be blamed on efforts at economy.-' 
Although many problems "ere encount .ered in estab-
lishing a _beachhead near Pusan, MacArthur managed to put 
in two -battalions of infantry . These troops put up a "mag-
nificent resistance" before bei oo destroyed . After an 
amphibious landir...g at Inchon surprised the North Koreans on 
September 15, the United Nations forces were able to ad-
vance . 4 A few weeks later they neared the thirty-eighth 
parallel, and the question of crossing into North Korea 
confronted the Allied leaders . 
General Mac rthur submitted his plan for operations 
north of the parallel . The Eighth Army was to attack along 
the western coastal area while the Unit ed States Tenth 
Corps at Wonsan was to make an amphibious landing on the 
1 
~ ., p . 948. Bra dley's testimony . 
2
~ . , PP• 230-31. :;~ •t P• 237. 
4 Ib!d,., pp ., 231-32 . The Inchon landing was MacArthur 0 s 
idea. Louis Johnson testified that Collins had opposed the 
id~a, at:id Admiral Sherman had had reservations . (ib!d., p . 
2661). 
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eastern CC)aat of North Ko:rea. 1 On September 29 the Joint 
Chie f $ approved Mae.Art hur's plan, including, however, some 
restrictions on just how violent the att ack against Nor t h 
Korea should be . 2 Becau$e of serious political implica-
tions ·O! such an action, : no all-out bomb attack, nor any 
at t ack agains t Pyongyang and simi lar tar gets, should be 
authorized without prior cl earance with the Joint Chiefs o! 
Sta-ff . Accordin g to General Collins. this was beeause we 
wished to avoid bombing cities which would later have to b~ 
rebuilt . 3 We had also assured ot her countries that in 
carrying out military efforts north ot the parallel, cau -
tion would be taken not to do any t hing likely to extend 
the conflict. For this reason orders had been sent that 
United Nati ons tro -ops were not to cross t he Manehurian 
border under any circ umstances and that no non- Kor ean fore .es 
shc,)uld be used in t he prov:inc~s bordering t be Soviet Union 
and Manchuria . 4 
On October 7, United Nations support of the aross1:ng 
of the parallel was obtained when Great Britain :tntroduced 
a resolution that the forees in Korea should proceed with 
the pacification and unification o! all o! Korea.5 The 
JCS we-re then authorized to direct General Mae.Arthur to 
l 2 . · 
· Ib~d . t P • ?19 . Ibid., PP• 245 and 340 . 
3 
~ - - pp . 1362-6~ . 
4 Ioid. , , P• 1230• testimony 
5roid . • PP• 2698 and :;171. 
Times o:f'October 8 1 1950, troops 
ot General Collins . 
Accordi ng to the New York 
cro$Sed the paralleI at 
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plan for the possible occupation o.f North Korea, but to 
execute such plans only with the approval of the President. 
In the event of occupation o.f North Korea by Soviet or Chi• 
nese Communist force$, General MacArthur should undertake 
no ground operations north of the parallel; however, air 
and naval operations should not be disco ntinue~ . Final de-
cisions would have to be made in view of possible actions 
by the Soviet Union and t he Chinese Communists. If Chinese 
troops came south of the parallel, the United States would 
not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with 
Communist China. General MacArthur was authorized to con-
tinue military action as lon g as there was a reasonable 
chance of successful resistance. 1 
On October 24• General MacArthur inforroeo. the field 
comm.anders that he was lifting restrictions on movement of 
the forces in North Korea and was authorizing them to cap-
ture all of the territory, He cautioned, nevertheles s t 
that Unit ed Nations forces other than South Korean should 
3:14 A.,M. EST on October 7. This was before the General 
Assembly had approved the resolution. MacArthur stated 
that on tle basis of this resolution he had ample justifi~ 
cation for crossing the border between North and South Ko-
rea (ibid ., p. 245 i cf. General Bradley• s testimony, . !lli• t 
P• 98.,,,-r;- . 
1Ibid., p. 718. Read by Senator Morse from 'the docu-
ment ''Joint Cbie.fs of Stat! Report for Senate Committees 
on Korean Operations . 0 Accordin g to Millis, p. 27, this 
directive placed responsibility ror decisions on MacArthur 
which should have been made in Washington. If Washington 
was ready to send troops into North Korea, it should have 
been prepared to meet possible consequences. And yet orders 
.!ailed to provide specifically for the possibility of Chi-
nese intervention. · 
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be withdrawn us soon as feasible and be supplanted by 
Korean units . On t he same day the Joint Chief ·s o.t: Sta.ff 
advised the .,,ar :Sast Commander of the inconsistency of this 
order with tDeir policy of not allowinE non-Koreans in the 
area close to the Yalu . As General Collins pointed out, 
there r..a d been plenty of time for MacArthur to wire and 
inform ~ashington of his opinion on the disposition of 
troops before giving these orders. 1 
The Communist Chinese Invasion 
Did General Mac rthur have adequate warning of the 
Chinese invasion into North Korea? Wby did he , during a 
lull in the fighting, launch. an o•.ffensive on November 24 
which was to end the war, but which instead led to mass 
Chinese intervention? At a conference on Wake Island in 
mid-October between President ruman and the General, the 
Commander-in-Chief had requested ManArthur 's opinion of the 
possibility of Chinese or Soviet intervention. His answer 
had been that they might be able to send in fifty or sixty 
thousand Chinese troops, but without air force support 
"there would be tbe greatest slaughtern if they tried to 
drive south to Pyongyang . He could not picture Russian 
planes effectively working with Chinese grotind troops. 2 
1Militar~Situation in the Far Bas~, p. 1240 . When 
questioned by ~rse on whether the JCS were in a good posi-
tion to pass judgment on military tactics with the aid of 
terrain maps , Collins answered in the afiirmative (~., 
pp. 1300 and 1312-13). 
2Truman, p. ?566. 
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During t he hea.rin r,s Hae.Arthur s pok e of some know-
led ge of Chinese power wt.en he stated that, "the Chi neee 
Communists had collected lar ge forces along t he Yalu Fiver . 
f··y own reconnaissance, you understand, was limited entirely 
to Korea; but t he general in J orm ation wl' · ch was &.vailable, 
from China and other places, indicated lar ge accumulations 
of troops . lt1 He had certainly known or a Chinese troop 
movement up the coast o! China in the direction of Korea in 
September. From about the twenty - seventh of that month 
more and more evidence of. possible Communist interv e tion 
came in. However, some of t..,es e reports came from Chinese 
Nationalist sources, previously mistaken in t i1eir estimate . 2 
Other nations gave warnings . On October 3 th~ Chi -
nese Communist Foreign Minister informed the Indian Ambassa-
dor at Peiping of China ' s threat to send troops into Korea 
i.f t h e United Natiot1s .forces cros eed t he parallel . Never-
t heless, the thre atened action was 1ot to be carried out i.f 
only Sou th Korean troops crossed ird~o ""forth Korea. This 
warnin B could have ·ell been view ed with scepticism by Amer-
ican officials. First, the Communists mi Jht have been inteF -
ested primarily in influencing the United Nations, for on 
1
~U i tary Si tuationJ .~ the Ff E~st, p._1a . · While 
speaking of the difiieu ! ty of knowing in Washin gton what 
happen d bRtween November 6 and the full invasion of the 
twentyusixth, General Bradley said that much o:f the intel-
ligence lackin g to the JCS should have come fro.c1 MacArthur's 
own :field command . Even though the gromad w.as hea vily 
wooc,ied and troops were diffic ult 'tio see, a concentration 
of . force on the right .flank of the Ei ghth Army should have 
been picked up by air and naval reconnaissance (~. ~P. vl0;6} 
2
~ ., p . 1234; testimony of General Collins . 
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October 4 the Politice.l Committee of the General As s embly 
was to vote on a resolution.calling for steps to en.sure 
conditions of stabilit y throu .shout Korea. 1 B ..J ond, t he 
Indian .Ambassador had be.fore warned of att;aoks which had 
nev er materialized . 2 
Although the first Chinese prisoner was captu r ed on 
October 26• as late as November 4 MacArt ur reported that 
while Chinese intervention was a distinct possibility, 
there ' H:lS not sufl'ieient evidence to be posi t~ve of it . 
However, the very next day the General submitted a special 
report to the United I'ia.tions reporti ng his :forces "in hos-
tile contact with Chinese Communist mi l itary uJl.its o113 On 
Nove mber 24, when a mass movement across the parallel 
occu rred ~ it was still t. e vi ew in Washington that t he Chi -
nese obj ect ive was to obtain a United Nations withdrawal by 
inti mida ti on and diplomatic mean~, and th at .only if these 
4 £ailed would there be i ncreasing intervention . During the 
hearin gs, Acheson spoke oi the lack of real adYanta ge to 
China in becoming involved and t 11e l os s she would sustain 
in her international position in doing so as reasons why i t 
was th ought the Chinese Communists would not intervene . 5 
2Rovere and Schlesi ger , p . 148 . During the hearings , 
Ma.c Arttur claimed t ,, t- he had received no of .ficial -notifica -
tion of t his warning by the Chinese , that all he knew was 
g leaned .from readin g t he newspapers (Militar1 Situatio!L!!! 
the Far East , p . 109). 
3Ibid • t P• 1833. 
5Ibid., p . 2101 . 
-
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I 
The authore of The G~neral and the President are 
quite severe on General MacArthur !or not making better use 
of the intelligence he had. After showing tbe number of 
Chinese encountered in late O tob rand early November, the 
authors accused the general of making light of the Chinese 
intervention, even reporting from ~okyc on the day eight 
Chinese divisions were identified in Korea that ther · was 
insufficient evidence. to accept the invasion as a 1'aot~ 1 
According to the authors, it was still a puz~le after the 
hearings just why General MacArthur launched an offensive 
on. November 24 with .forces he knew to be .in£ rior in num-
bers to the Communists. 2 Perhaps he believed that the Chi-
nese would back down if he were firm, and, too, he might 
have considered a holding back under the circumstances as 
a sign o! weakness • .3 
In supporting his advance at the end of November, 
MacArthur explained: 
Now wha't we actually did was to move for-
ward to ascertain in strength of the enemy'• 
forces. 
When w& moved forward~ I had already pre-
pared, and the troops had in their hands, the 
order for retreat if we found the enemy in 
force. What we did was really a reconnaissance 
in force. It was the only way we had to £ind 
out what the enemy had and what his intentions 
were.4 - · 
Ibis assertion eonfliets with , · acArthur' s co mmunique' of Nov-
ember 24 desori~tng the coming campaign and ending with the 
1Rovere and Schlesinger, pp. 135-36. 
2 Ibid. 1 p. 152. . 3Ibig., p. 140. 
4Military Situat4"9p in the Far East, pp. 20-21. 
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sentence: "If successful, this should £or all practical 
purposes end the war •• tt 
• • During the hearings, Collins 
declared that MacArthur was "bent upon tho de,.. ruction of 
the North Korean forces." 1 
Had the Far East commander used poor judgment in the 
deployment of his tr oops in November? MacArthur spoke of 
complete coordination of the Eighth Army and the Xth 
Corps under hi.s direction. Nevertheless , the Joint Chiefs 
had evidently been somewhat worried about the disposition 
of the forces b.efore t he Chinese invasion and had asked 
MacArthur politel y if he needed additional directives. 
'.-1 Lon he an swered in the negative, Washington did not pursue 
t ho matter, for strategy was considered the responsibility 
of a theater commander. 2 ltJ 1en after the first Chinese 
blows, the Far Bast oommander supported the separation of 
the Xth Corps from the E1ghth Army with the as sertion that 
the terrain was t oo rugGed !or the enemy to be oble to take 
advantage of any delay in ~oordinatin g activities 1 the JCS 
demanded t he extrication of the advanced units of t he Mar ... 
ines. 'I'he Far t a.st commander soon after1ttards told Collin s 
1lli£ . , p .• 1369 . 
2 Ibid . , p . 246. From hindsight, Bradley would have 
deployedtroops a little difierently, although, he admitted 
MacArthur might have had some additional information which 
· made him deploy the~ troops as b.e did (ibid., p . 972). li 
.ac.Arthur had had this information, it-rs-surprising h~ had 
not mentioned it. As it was , he stated during the hearings 
that ''the disposition o! those troops ., in my opin1on, could 
not nave been imp1·oved upon , had I known the Chinese were 
g oin g to attack (!!!!S •, P• 19) .li 
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that if the restrictions on air recc.mnais sance were re• 
moved• maximum use made of the Chinese N'ati onalists; Man• 
churia bombarded, and a -naval blockade mountedt he would 
be willing to reeombine the Xth Corps with t.he Eighth 
Army to hold a line a.oroes Korea. This was t he saine line 
which he had conside .red impractical on tiovember 30 when 
questioned by his superiora. 1 
An Entirely New War 
Whe:n 1 t beeame obvious that the Chinese were invading 
in large numbers and had initiated ttan entire l y new w~," 
as the leader of the United riations forces called it, what 
oourse.s were open to the admiristration? De.fore the congres-
sional committees General MacArthur stated that. China should 
have been warned st that if she did net witbin a. reasonable 
ti.me discuss a cease .... fire order,. . - • , the entire force of 
the United Nations would be utilized to bring to an end the 
predatory attack 0£ her forces on ours~" 2 In spite o! this 
declaration, Collins could not recall the Far East oo~ander 
ever making a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs that an 
ultimatum be issued to the Chinese •. ,; On the other band,. · 
they gave him ao new directive to replace the one ot clear-
ing North Korea of enemy troops. 4 
:1 Mill.is, PP• 296-97 ·• 
~~~i·tw Situ~tion in the; Far Ea.s~, pp •. 29-30. 
3Ibid . • P • 1261 . 4 Ibid . t P • 30. 
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Nevertheless, the general did have his own program 
to solve the Korean problem . His reports to Washington at 
this time were very pessimistic . On December:; he des-
cribed his army as qfacin g the entire Chinese nation in an 
unde~lared war • .u "Unless some positive and immediate action 
is taken• tt he continued• "hope for success cannot be justi ... 
fied and steady attrition leading to final destruction can 
reasonablf be contemplated. 111 In light of tnis rep.art, the 
Pre s ident sent General Collins to Korea to view the situa-
tion . The Far East commander explained to the Army Chief 
of Staf.f +:b~ee couraea of action which he saw a.a possible .. 
One or these was to continue the fight with the txisting 
limitations on action (no air attacks on Manchurian bases, 
no naval blockade of China, no use of Nationalist Chinese 
troops, and no great increase in the nUll!ber of United Na-
tions troops in Korea) . By doing this, however• the United 
Nations would be for ced out of Korea . A seoond ehoioe 
eould be to continue the light without the above restric~ 
tioflS. This was the course 0£ action preferred by the 
United Nations ~ commander . An armistice in which the Chi-
nese Communists agx-eed to remain north of the 'thirty-eighth 
par3llel was t~e third possible aetion . 2 
1In the following month the idea of evacuation was 
considered by .the military in Washington . However, in view 
or pessimistic repat'ts MacArthur was sending the JCS there 
seems little basis for his later statement that "the Joint 
Chiefs of .Sta.ff were not sure we could stiek in Korea . It 
was my opinion that we eould. ,u Quoted by Sen . Smith (~., 
p. uoo. 
2 Truman_, p. 41:5. 
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President Truman was concerned at the distance be -
tween the administration' a policy ~1nd these ideas advocated 
by the United Nations• commander . 1 This difference in out-
look became more obvious in the exchanges which occurred 
between Tokyo and '1!a-shington in December and January. In 
mid-December the United tates supported a resolution intro-
duced in the United Nations by India which advocated setting 
up a three-man committee to explore the basie for a cease-
fire. The Communists kept advancing, however, and on Dec-
ember 29 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur a. new 
directive, thus replacing his basic orders of September 15 . 
After mentioning that Chinese Communist forces appeared 
capable of fo::-cing evacuation and after stressing the impos-
sibility of providing more troops, the Joint Chiefs told 
Mac .Arthur that his basic directive was henceforth to be "to 
defend in successive positions, subject to safety of your 
troops as your primary consideration , inflicting as mue.h 
damage to hostile !orees in Korea as possible . It The direc-
tive then went on to state that he was to 11make advanced 
determination o.f rthe) last reasonable opportunity for or-
derly evacuation.tt 2 
In his reply of December ;o General 1acArthur held 
that a forced evacuation ot Korea would have an adverse ef-
fect upon the peoples of Asia and t bat the eventual results 
of such action would call £or even greater forces in the Far 
l Ibid . , P• 416. 
-2
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' ast. He did not want to evacuate his troops, but i nti-
mated that he might be foreed to do so if he were not given 
· reinforcements and if one or more of tho restrictions 
plaeed on him wer not removed. 
On January 9 the Joint Chiefs of Sta!f informed the 
general that these restrictions, amounting to ret aliatory 
rneasures ~hich mi ght enlar ge the conflict, could .not be re-
moved. He should, the r efo~e, defend t he penin s ula in suc-
cessive posi ti.on s , inflicting maxi oum damages on the ene my. 
He should continually keep in mind the sa.fety or his troops 
and his basic mission of protectin Japan. Only if it be-
came evident th at evacuation was essential to avoid severe 
losses of men an material was he to withdraw from the pen-
insula.1 
On January 10 General -:ac Arthur reported t l e military 
advisability of withdrawing fr om Korea, althou gh he men-
tioned that political ~onsiderationn might make it imprac-
tical to do so . 2 Two days later Tokyo headquarters received 
a report from the JCS which General Mao rthur inte rp r ete d 
as a possible change in American policy and an agreement in 
2His report stat.ed that uin t he absen ce o! ove riding 
political considerations• •• the command should be with -
drawn from the peninsula just as r apidly as it is feasible 
tactically to o so . I.f, on the other hand, t he primary 
political i cterests o.f the United States in the Far ..t!,ast 
lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down 
a lar ge se gment of the Chinese military potential , the mil-
itary course is implicit in political polic y and e sho uld 
be prepared to ac cept any ,atte ndant •·haza r d - to Japa n ·• s secu-
.city and whatever c asualties result ~~ibi<!,., p . 906 )." 
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principle to his proposals on action against the Chinese. 
Faced with the possibility of eyaouation, the Joint Chiefs 
had made several studies and had finally drawn up a list o.f 
sixteen actions which might be take.n to prevent the loss of 
Korea. Included in t he sixteen were- the .tour sug estions 
aade by Gen$ral Mae.Arthur to Collins in Korea and again in 
the December 30 report to the Joint Chiefs. Unfortunately, 
the copy of the study eent to MacArthur did not indicate 
how it had been devis~d and st,,·-t .ed o!f with the statement 
"it has been tentatively agreed . Although Bradley 
suggested that the sixteen steps ·w-ere to be taken in case 
0.r all-out war w-1 th CJaina .• 2 General r,<iarsball indicated the 
opposite, evacuation from Korea, wouJ.d call up these points 
for considet-ation . In addition, a low level of more.le 
among the troops might n-eoess.itate the use of some 0£ the 
a.otions. even i.f the situation in Korea were stabilized . 3 
Pointing to the ambiguity contained in the stated 
purpose of the study , General She.rman characterized Mae-.. 
Artnur•Sc interpretation that the Joint Chiefs .favored these 
measures as not unreasonable. However, any doubt in the 
mind of the Far Ea.st ccmmand$r should have been reraoved 
shortly after this when Generals Hoyt Vandenbe-rg.and Col-
lins went to Korea. Collins tried to make clear to General 
MacArthur that the proposals . were only part of a study. a 
1Ibid . 1 P • 106 . During the hearings MacArthur ad-
mitted tbai the paper had been sent .to him only for his 
ini'ormation . · 
a . 3 
~ • , P• ?36 . !b!9:_• • P•· 334• 
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name which Mac Arthur himse l f had used when referring to 
. l t hem in the hearin 6 s. 
On January 13 President Truman sent a messa ge to Tokyo 
out lini i mportant political factors purposely omitted 
fr om t he message of the previous day . He wrote of the nt~e 
cessity for prudence in taking any actions which might 
alienate t he allies or extend the area of hostilities .. Af·-
ter writing oS t he deter r ent to communism whic h a succ ess-
ful resistance in Korea would be, he maintained th a t al ' 
thou gh it might be necess ar y to \./ithdraw fr om Korean soil, 
it should be made c l ear that t he course was being forced on 
us by military .ne·eessity and that we planned to rectify the 
situation . 2 Understandably , neither MacAJ:>thur nor the ad-
ministration wanted to be blamed for a with drawal from the 
peninsula . 
Fortunately, evacuation was soon deemed unneoessary, 
According to Collins, both he and MacArthur reviewed the 
situation and .found United Nations forces capable of main-
tainin g their position . On January 17 General Collins 
found the Ei g th Army in good shape with its morale improv-
ing . ' At a meeting on this same day t he National Security 
Council agreed to th e inadvisability of putti ng all the 
recommendations into eff'ect since conditions in Korea had 
changed in the preceding week~ The military situation was 
1
~ .. • pp . T:>?, 1220 , and 2111 . 
2 Ibid . , p . 503. General Marshall read a paraphrase 
o.f the messa ge . 
3 Ibid.,~• }24 ; test i ~ony of General Marshall. 
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beginning to improve, and during tbe latter .half of Janu• 
a.ry the enemy was on the defensive, When during February 
and March United Nations forces maintained the initiative, 
it was fortunately unnecessary to carry- out any of the 
courses of action outlined in the Joint Chiefs' study~ 1 
As the military situation improved, the administra-
tion conferred with other governments to establish a basis 
for a possible eease-fire. Without clearance from Washing-
ton, General MacArthur issued a statement on March 24 
offering to con.fer with the enemy and inferring that the 
war might be enlarged if the Communists did not come to 
terms.. When ot .her statements of the general continued to 
reveal his disagreement with the administration on military 
and political strategy , President Truman decided to remove 
him from his commands in the Ftu" Ea.st. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RECALL 
MacArthur•s Return to the United States 
When !n April 1951 Douglas MacArthur returned to the 
United States, Americans accorded him an acclaim greater 
than any citizen bad received since Lindbergh's flight 
across the Atlantic and subsequent reception. A storm of 
protest against the removal aro -se immedie_tely. During the 
Senate hearings in May and June t Senators questioned admin-
iatrati ve o.fficials to pinpoint reasons for the President 's 
action . Republican Senators tried to prove that Truman 
had acted precipitously and because of personal prejudice. 
Nevertheless, from testimony of both military and. politieal 
officers, it soon became clear that all had agreed to the 
wisdom of Truman•s move. 
On April 6t 1951, the President had eallea for a 
meeting to discuss a letter from MacArthur to Republican 
Congressman Joseph Mart in. The chief executive had already 
made up his mind to dismiss the general, but wanted the 
_opinions of his chief advisers before making a:ny announce-
ment. Present at the meeting were Dean Aeheson, eorge 
Mars ha ll, Omar ra dley, and Averell Harriman. The decision 
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to relieve the com ander was unanimous. In fact, Averell 
Harriman the~ght that he should have been relieved two 
years earlier, an opinion shared by Marshall after he had 
read MacArthur• s communications with Washington. 1 When the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked if it was militarily f~a-
-·" 
sible to leave t he general in charge of the occupation of 
Japan while removing him from his Korean post, they agreed 
that it was not. 2 
News of the dismissal rea-ched MacArthur over a com-
mercial b ·oad-oast, taking him by surprise .. Secretary oi' 
the Army Frank Pace, who was then in Korea, was to have 
delivered the President's messa ge to the general. Because 
of the breakdown of a power unit in Pusan, Pace could not 
be reached. Hearing of a possible leak, administration o.r-
fieials then announced t he dismissal. The action came as 
a surprise both to the American public and to the person 
most involved.:3 
Issues involved in dismis s in g General MacArthur were 
of the greatest importance, ran ging .from the power of the 
President as Commande~ in Chie!, American security, the 
situation in Japan, reaction abroad ., to the possibility of 
a public controversy in the United States .4 In bis testi-
mony before the committees, General Bradley pointed to 
2 lb1d., PP• 345 and 740. 
pp. 421 ~nd 1773• 
p . 17?6• testimoey of Marshall. 
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three military rea sons for which the Joint Chiefs believed 
MacArthur should be relieved.t The first of these was that 
by public statements and official communica tions he had · 
indicated a lack of sympathy with the decision to try to 
limit the war to Korea. 'rhis would make it more difficult• 
fer him to earry out directives. Seeond, he had failed to 
comply w~th a dfreetive e.f December 6• 1950, to clear pol-
icy statements with Washington be.fore publishing them, . 
Also, he had. taken independent action 1.n proposing to nego-
·tiate directly with the enemy and had made that proposal 
publie even though he knew that the g<;werrunent was already 
considering neg(>tiationslJ Third, the J9int Ohie.fs felt 
that the civ111nn authority o! the country must control the 
militari. 1 
Differing Views on Formesa 
Although his public announcements were the main rea-
son for MacArthur 1 s dismissal, his first rift w:i.th the ad-
ministration came ove!.' an interpretation .which the world 
put on a visit he made . Aft-er the Jup.e invasion from 
North Korea• the Soviet Union accused the United States of 
aggression and of designs on Formosa . In July MacArthur 
1Ibid . • PP·• 878-79. Marshall also emph~sized the res-
ponsibility o! the JCS, the Secretary o! Defense, and the 
President, who have an overall view of the objectives of the 
nation, to determine where the main threat 1ies, where we 
must fight holding actions, and where we must ga'in time to 
grow stronger. He added, "What is new and what has brought 
about the necessity for General MacArthur'"' .temoval is th o 
wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander 
publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement 
with the foreign and rnilitary policy of the United States , 
(ibid., P• 325h" 
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let Washington know of his plan to inspect Formosa, now 
under his command. Because other countries might interpret 
this visit as a preparation to help the Formosans in an 
attack against the mainland, the.Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff sug-
gested to the Far East commander that he might ant to send 
a subordinate to view the situation on the island . 1 In 
spite of this suggestion, the general went himse lf. His 
visit received much publicity in the world press and was 
interpreted as possibly foreshadowing a change in United 
States policy . In view of this, Louis J ohnson dispatched 
a directive to MacArthur reminding him oi.' the United States 
policy of preventing the Generalissimo .from attackin g the 
mainland . .Al thou gh the gen eral an swered that he understood 
and would be obedient to the directive, the administ r ation 
sent Averell Harriman to the Far East to ensure his com-
pliance. After conferring with the gene ral, Harriman re-
mained dubious of Mac .Arth ur's full acceptance o! adminis-
trative policy. The general even advanced his readiness to 
de.al with policy problems, but only if given further orders 
from the President permitting him to do so . 2 Truman soon 
i.ssued a statement that he and the general saw _ «eye to eyeu 
o.n Formosa . 3 It was quickly se en that this was not so when 
on August 12 the Far Ea.st C@mmander issued a statement at-
tacking those who "invariably in t tie past have -propag andized 
---·--- ------------------------1-!QJ!! • )· p. 173. 2Millis t PP• 268·- 69 . 
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a policy of de featism and appeasement in the Paci.f'icu and 
who were now misrepresenting his trip to Formosa. He hoped 
the American people would not "be misled by s ly insinuation• 
brash speculations, and bold misst atements inva.r.iably attri-
buted to anonymous sources." 1 Many saw this as an attack 
against the Truman 4dministration. 
His dise. gr eeraent 'A'ith the administration appeared 
again in August in a message he prepared for delivery to 
the Veterans of Forei gn Jars . Allies in the United Nations 
were still nervo us over the pos .sibility that the Kor ean 
conflict might spr ead. This fear would certainly not be 
alleviated by-,_MacArthur al~egi ,as he did in this message, 
that there existed an island chain, supposedly including 
Formosa , from which "we can dominate wi th air power every 
Asiat ic port- from Vladivostok to Singapore ... • • The 
belligerent tenor of the .speech surprised and disturbed the 
Presid ent . He thus requested the general to withdraw it. 
Unfortunately, the of£ice 0£ the Far East Commander had 
already submitted a copy to the press which , subsequently 
appeared in two popular magazines.3 
The December 6 Directive 
No dissonance between Mac.Arthur and t h& President was 
discernible from A.Y.gust to November, during which time they 
1
r.iiillis, p. 270. 
2t-Ulitarl Si ,uation in the Far East, p. 2002. 
3rbid., PP• 121? and 200;. Testimony of General 
Collinsarui Dean Acheson. 
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met on the island of "ake . However, after tl:le massive Chi-
nese Communist attack at the end of November, General Mac.,.. 
Arthur made several statements attempting to ju.stify his 
reoent strategy. Arthur Krock of the New York Times had 
sent a telegram to MacArthur requesting his comment on 
statements by officials that he had re.fused to accept re- •-
sponsibility for the security of his command if any halt 
were made short o.£ · the Yalu. MacJ.+thur • s remarkable reply 
was , nThere is no validity whatsoever to the anonymous gos -
sip to which you re!er." 1 Yet only six days previously 
the JCS bad suggested limiting contact with the Chinese and 
the possibility 0£ a neutral zone . 
In an exchange with the editors of United States News 
and World Report, MacArt~'lur was asked, "Are the limitations 
which prevent unlimited pursuit of Chinese lar ge forces and 
unlimited attack on their bases re garded by you as a handi-
cap to effective military operations~ ·., 
"An enormous handicap, without precedent in history•" 
was MacArthur•s frank answer . 2 
These statements appeared in the press at a time when 
Prime Minister Attle ·e was in Washington speaking in favor 
of a limited war. MacArthur's statements calling for a 
more active campaign thus greatly embarrassed the adminis-
tration. Consequently, on December 6• 1950, the Joint 
Chiefs issued a directive to all t heater commanders 
1 Ibid ., P • 34-9:, •. 
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ordering them to exercise caution in their publi.c state-
menta., They should el ear , any mess-age concerning foreign 
policy with the Departm•nt of State and statement1' con-
eerning _.military policy with the Department of Defense be-
fore releasing them~ 1 
When General MacArthur pointedly submit t ed his nex t 
routine announcement .for approval, Washington informed him 
that such communiques need not be cleared. General Whitney 
later asserted that the December 6 directi ve was inter-
preted at Far East headquarters as applying solety to .for• 
, 
mal public sta:tements and not to comrouniJ1ues • correspondence, 
and conversation .2 It was not until several months later 
that MacArthur actually released state .meuts contrary to 
administration policy . Meanwhile; he had been trying to 
change the policy of holding the line in Korea b:}r stating 
in reports to the Joint Chiefs that he might not 'be able ·to 
withstand the Chinese hordes unless given permission to use 
greater .fo_pee against them. 3 
Di!ferenee~ 4f Opinion on Military Matters 
General MacArthur declared i:a his testimony that 
there never was a more .subordinate $Oldier than himself . 
As :Bradley would stre.ss 1 this was true in the military 
sphere. However, the Joint G,b,i.e.ts did not believe this to 
1
~ . , P• 442 - (see appendix). 
2 Ibi,d. ,. p . 417; !rom a quot•tion read by Senator Wiley. 
:,~p:t'a, PP• 50-,3,. 
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true in the realm of public announcements and in the 
announced policy of containing the war in Korea. 1 Gen-
eral Collins aiiuded to MacArthur's disregard of a direc-
tive when he sent American troops to the front near the 
Yalu without so advising the Joint Chiefs. During the 
hearings, MacArthur asserted the necessity of doing this 
because 0£ the military impracticability of drawing a line 
on the territory short 0£ the Yalu. 2 The difference of' 
opinion between headquarters in Japan and the administra-
tion burst abruptly into print on February 14 when the New 
York Times quoted the Far East aommander as stating: 
The concept advanced by some that we should 
establish a line across Korea and enter into 
. pos1tional warfare is wholly unrealistic and 
illusory, It fails completely to take into ac-
count the length of such a line at the narrowest 
lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved and 
the relatively small force which could be com-
mitted for the purpose . 3 . 
This was a definite criticism of a plan which the adminis -
tration might advance as an official solution of the Korean 
problem, 
According to administration officials, MaeArthur~s 
next controversial statement actually amounted to a nulli-
-
Iication of the effect of measures which the United Nations 
might have taken to ensure an armistice . On March 20 the 
Joint Chiefs advised the Far East Commander of United 
l 2 illg . , p . 109!5, Ibid., p .. 1216 . 
3~ . , p. 475; quoted by Senator Johnson. 
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Nations preparedness to dis eu:ss uconditions 0£ settlement" 
with the enemy. It wa$ believed in Washington that a .turw 
ther attempt at negotiations should be made before the 
parallel was oros ,sed again. The milita:cy chi.e.fs did not, . 
however, want to restrict operations and requested infor-
mation on ·what authority MacArthur needed in the next few 
week$ to provide security for his forces and maintain con• 
tact with the enemy• 1 They nad> already instructed Mac ... 
Arthur to report any request by the Communists ~or.an arm:ie 
stiee in tbe .f'ield . This was to be sure tbat poli tieal 
questions might be eqnsidered in any agreement . 2 
On March 21 MacArthur responded that the existing in-
hibitions should not be increased . Indeed,- he continued, 
because of the military disadvantages arising from these 
restrictions upon air and naval operations, in adq.it.ion to 
the disparity in the size of' the opposing forces, it would 
b·e practically impa&aibl .e to cle'ar North Korea of the enem;. 
President Truman and his advis~rs were shocked when 
General MacArthur issued a publie statement tha.tt 
the enemy1 there.fore, must by , now be pain-
.fully •aware that a decision o.f the United 
Nations to depart from its tolerant effort 
to contain the war to the area of Kore.a 
through an expansion of our military. oper-
ations to its coastal areas and interior 
bases would doom R~d China to the risk or 
imminent military collapse. These basic 
facts being established, there sl,Iould be 
no insuperable diffieulty in arriving ~t 
decisions on t.he Korean problems if the 
l Ibid. 1, p . , 41.l . 
2 Ibid ., P• 1197 ; testimony of General Collins . 
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issues are resolved on their own merits, 
without being burdened by extraneous 
matters not directly related to Korea, 
:suoh as Formosa or uh.ina• ·s seat in the 
Unit$d Nations .1 
The Korean nation and people, which 
have been SQ cruelly ravaged, must not 
be sacrificed, This is a paramount con-
cern~ Ap.art .from the ilitary area of 
the problem where issues are resolved in 
the course o! combat, the .fundamental 
questions continue to be political in na~ 
ture and must find their answer in the 
diplomatic sphere. witJhln _the area o! my 
authority as the military commander• how-
ever, it would be needless to say that I 
stand ready at any time to con!er in the 
field with the eommander-i-in-chief of the 
enemy forces in the earnest effort to find 
any militaey means whereby realisation of 
the political objectives of the United 
Nation$ in Korea, to whieh no nation may justly take exception, might be ac~om~ 
plished without !urthe -r bloodshed. _ · 
Secretary o! Defense Marshall was the most emphatic 
0£ the witnesses in enunciating the dam~e done by Mac-
Arthur in making 'th.is statement-. He asserted that propo-
sals the President had planned -to make and which had a 
chance o.r terminating the fighting were dropped wh-e.n 11we 
had spoken again with two voicee ••• ,"' 
1Ibid., 1ox1 2IbiA qo 72 p. / . • , u., pp. ( - fl 
- -3Ibid,, pp. 344 and 429. See also Acheson•s testi-
mony (i6Ia:'~ pp. 1774-75). According to James Reston , this 
statem~by Mao.Arthur did not upset the administrative 
applecart, Because the Chinese offensive was well organ-
ized by thia time and the draft o.r the President's state• 
ment actually offered less than Peiping had rejected in 
January, when the United States had s.pecitically mentioned 
discussion of Formosa and or Chinese admission to the Un1-
ted Nations , the Chinese Oonununists _would not have accepted 
Truman• s terms ( New Yot"k Times 1 May 9, 1951).~ 
6? 
Letter to Joseph Mart in 
After this statement of March 24 Truman began to 
make plans £or the removal of Douglas MacArthur . An ex-
cuse for doing so was offered on April .5. House minority 
leader Joseph Martin had requested MacArthur's views on 
the importance of Asia versus Europe in the world strug (.;le 
and on the use of Formosan troo ps to open a second .front 
to relieve t '1e pressure on Korea . He enclosed the · text of 
a speech he had made advocating Formosan action against 
the mainland . In his answer to the Congressman, G~nera l 
MacArthur wrote; 
My views and recommendations with -_,respect 
to the situation created by Red China's entry 
into the war against us in Korea have been sub-
mitted to Washin gt on in most complete deta;i.l •. 
Generally these views are well known and gener-
ally understood• as they follow the conventional 
patt rn of meeting force with m;u:imum counter -
force .as we have never failed to do in th e past. 
Your vi ·ew with respect to the utilization of the 
Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with 
neither logic nor this tradition.l 
On the respective importance of Europe and Asia, 
General MacArthur wrote, "Here we fight Europe's war 
with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with 
words ..... As you pointed out , we must win . There is 
no subtsti tute for victory . "2 This letter indicated agai .n 
that MacArthur did not agree with administrative policy; 
it criticized what MacArthur always eonsid .ered the Eur ope 
1u.s., Congressis>nal Reco.r;<}, 82d Cong ., 1st S~lss~, 
1951 ♦ 3280 . · · r 
2
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fir$t policy of the Democrats and approved o! a policy in 
regard to the Chinese Nationalists which the a.dministrs:tio:n 
.feared might lead t<> a world war., Also• these paragraphs 
de!initel.7 involved foreign policy and should have been 
cleared under the Deoembe•r 6 directive-. The Far Ea~t oom .... 
mander did not request Martin to ke&'p his letter con.t'ide :n--
tial, even a.fter he had received a reminder .from -Washington 
to clear policy statements. Thu-s, on April 5 Represent.a-
ti ve Mart:tn read the letter b.ef'o.re the Hous•e, 1 
On March ,1 Henry Hazlitt, editor of The Jreeman sent 
MacArthur the following telegran1: 
Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400.000 
South Korean draftees as reported New York Times, 
March 31, dispatch from ?aegu? Previous state-
ments President Rhee reported request for such 
arms. 
MacArthur's answer as: 
I hav-e delayed reply to your message o.! the 
31st pending receipt here (),f the re.fe:reneed New 
York Times dispatch, There is nothing I ean add 
to the inf-ormatit)n therein contained~ The issue 
is one determined by the Republic: of Korea and 
the U~t .ed Stat es Government ., and in!olVJ,$ 'basic 
political decisions beyond my au'thor1t;1 . 
When in January the JOS had proposed providing arms 
tor thes,e same South Korean tx-oops, it had been MacArthur 
who had recommended giving the ams instead to the Japanese 
national poliee . · To make e.f!eotive use of additional. 
equipment. 'tihe Korean$ needed more t .raining. Between this 
suggestion ·ot January 6 and the writing o! his letter to 
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Martin, Mac Arthur had not ma.de ar 1y different recommenda-
tion to Washin gton on this question. General Matthew B. 
Ridgway and Admiral James A. Van Fleet still recommended 
that ne additional units be equipped. Besides, aocording 
to G~neral Bradley t the LJ.00,000 Koreans mentioned in the 
tele gram were not trained reserves . Many were physically 
unfit; others were suffering from malnutrition . Alo ; it 
had been the policy of beth MaeArthur and Ridgway to use 
any additional manpower available t o keep the units they had 
up to strength rather than to form new units . 1 
CHAPTER V 
POLICY AND TACTICS I N KOREA 
Differ i ng Aims of MacArthur and Truman 
While questioning Secretary .of Defense Marshall, Sen -
ator Saltonstall formulated in plain terms the divergent 
aims of MacArthur and the President in Korea . The Senator 
spoke of MacArthur's advoeacy of t•policies of action on our 
part that mi · ht l e ad us to be able to tell the m, ' Now we 
are going to continue · to go on unless you say you have had 
enough.•t.t He pictured administration policy as aiming "to 
try to kill of! enough Red Chinese, when they come on us , 
so that t bey say they have had enou gh . • · When he 
asked Marshall if that was not about the difference; the 
Secretary ' s reply was "I think that is about it . " Marshall 
added that i.f we infliet;ed losses on the Chinese, we could 
take the initiative in asking for a cease-fire. Above all, 
we were seeking a solution whiC'h would stop t he sac:r-ific -e 
l of our soldiers a nd prevent a spread of the strug f~le. 
MacArthur accused the administration of' needlessly 
sacri£icing American lives by not taking t he sterner mea-
s u.ces against the Chinese t1hich he advoc ated o Americans 
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were horrified at the idea o! thousands of their country-
men bei ng killed when the result would not be a total 
l victory• but the prevention of Communist gains. MacArthur 
held that if the United States continue d the war indefi-
nitely, the fighting would spread and increase the proba, ... 
2 bility of 'orld War III,. He ur ged putting all forces 
possible into a definite campaign to win . Accordi ng to 
General Mac rthur, the Chinese ability to wage war had .been 
eTeatly exa gge rated. A block~de would disrupt their econo-
my and thus make a victory for the West possi ,ble . ; 
This was cet'tainly not the administration ' s viewpoint . · 
fashington Jelt that carrying out M~cA~thur's proposals 
might well lead t o Russian intervention and a tragic exten-
sion of the war . In the words 0£ General Bradley, a war 
with Red China would 'be a tragic one "at the wrong place• 
at the wrong time , and with the wrong enemy." 4 Marshall 
considered Mac thur willing to risk war with Communist 
China or the Soviet Onion a.t the expense of losing allies 
and wreckins the 11coalition ·o.r free peoples throughout the 
world . u 5 
According to General Marshall, t he situation in Korea 
was not a stalemate as long a.s the United Nations had cer-
tain powers of maneuver and w.as inflicting severe punish-
ment .6 Dean Acheson went further than this, asserting that 
1MacArthur 
2 
· Ibid . , p . 
-5!_lli ., P• 
re.ferred to ca$ualty lists often. 
145. 3,!lli., P• 58. 4 Ibid ., P • 
1007. 6 Ibid., P • 1?16 . 
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the operation in Korea was a success , for the enemy had 
been prevented from accomplishing its declared objective 
_,--; 
of driving the United Nations out of Korea and imposing 
Communist rule on the pe ~insula . 1 The attainment of a 
uni.fied 1 free, and ·democratic Korea could no longer be the 
military aim of Korea, but should be acco mplished by peace-
2 ful means. 
During General Collins ' visit to Korea after the 
Chinese invasion, General MacArthur proposed the lifting 
of four restrictions; in his speech before Congress in 
April he again made four proposals for the amelioration of 
the United Nati ons ' position. These were: 
First, the intensification of our economic 
blockade against China. 
Second; the imposition of a naval bloekade 
against t he China coast . 
Third, removal 0£ restriction on air recon-
naissanee of China •s coastal areas ars.d of Man• 
churia.. -
Fourth, removal of restrictions on the 
forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with 
logistical support to contribute to their e!fec-. 
tive operation against the Chinese mainland . 3 
The most dr~stie o·f the reco mmendations was modified from 
' . 
the bombin g of Manchuria-•although the general still 
undoubt edl y pr ef erre d such aetion--to a reconnaissance of 
China's coastal area and Manchuria . The general advocated 
carrying out these proposals, even if the United Nations 
did not agree to them .4 
1 
.!E~•' p . , 1?16 • 
2 1729 ; ~ . , p .. c.f. Bradley's testimony (ibid . ,p.955). 
- . 
3 3556. Ibid . , p . 
-
4 Ib:J&., p . 198. 
Eeonomie . and liaval Blockades 
MacArthur's .fili"st suggestion before Congress was to 
impo.se an econornic b;lockade on China., thus depriving her or 
needed materials from t he Western nations . Administration 
witnesses agreed on the advisil?ility of this measure . In 
fact• other countries had already taken measures to make 
sure that Peiping did not receive strategic materials, 1 
There had b~en a general embargo by Western countries on 
the export of munitions to the Communist Chinese ever since 
they had been in power , E~bargoes had be en placed on othe .r 
produ c ts by the United States until, by December of 19.50, · 
no exports fr<lm iimerica to Peiping were allowed. By the 
end. of 1949 European allies had embar goed shipments to t he 
Soviet bloc of about two-thirds or the industrial items 
which our experts re garded as of: prime importance. The 
list of forbidden articles was expanded · in 1950 and 1951, 2 
although, as Genera l Marsholl testi fi ed, the blockade had 
been eff ective only to a limited extent . 3 Tbe British had 
not been willing to go as far in ensuring this blockade as 
had Americans . As Sena tor Wiley pointed out, t he Colonial 
Office had reported a sale o.f 120,000 tons of natural rub -
ber by British Malaya to China in the nine m-onths prec,eding 
May 1951,.4 This controversy over an econo mic blockade was 
eased somewhat during the hearings when .on May 18, 1951, a 
l~~, P• 1726 . 
-'Ibi!:'i., P • 328 . 
2 !bid •• PP• 1724-25 and ~86. 
4 Ibid., p . 424 .• 
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United Nations resolution called £or an embargo on stra-
tegi ·c exports to Communi st China. 1 
Although MacArthur an~ the administration agre ·ed on 
the importance of an economic blockade, there was a dif-
ference 0£ opinion on whether a naval blockade or the Chi-
nese mainland sh0uld be mounted. MaeAmhur pictured an ac-
tual blockade as threatening the destruction of millions of 
Chi~ese through starvation . 2 Like MacArthur, Generals 
Wedemeyer and Chennault favored a naval blockade, even over 
United :Nations• objeetions.3 General Marshall believed that 
a blocka4e might eventually have a serious et.feet on the 
Chinese Communist government . 4 Nevertheless, he saw the 
danger of. an early Russian entran-0e into the war if the tfa'WIJ 
ventured as far as Port Arthur.5 
· General Collins believed that a naval blockade would 
have to include Dairen and possibly Vladi vcbstolt . 6 Bradley 
_opposed a nav~l blockade . as an act ... o:f war which would affect 
1when a group of Republicans presented their views of 
the hearings, they accus_ed the Uui ted Nations of taking hes-
1 tant steps toward ensuring an embargo . As an appendix to 
the report they included summaries of the steps different 
countries had taken to ea:rry out the Nay 18 resolut.ion (fill • , pp .• 3587 and 3625-55 ). · 
2Ibid., P• 179. Admiral Sherman agreed with Mac-
Arthur's estimation that the Navy had enou gh ships to carry 
through a blockade (ag . , p ,; 1527). 
3rbid . , pp~ 2314 and 334-2. 4~ . , pp .. 355 and 359. 
5Ibid . ,, P• 482 . According to Rovere and Schlesinger, 
Japan un~ MacArthur bad sent over 19.5 million dollars 
worth of materials to China . 85~ of which was iron and steel 
sheet, machine tools, etc. !Rovere and Schlesinger, p. 222). 
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not only China but also Russian Port Arthur and British 
. l 
Hong Kong • . Aacording to Secret or y of State Acheson, the 
success of a naval blocka de would depend on certain circum-
stances; a discussion of these cir~umstanees was deleted 
from the record of the hearings. 2 While the blockade of 
North Korea did not involve any extension of hostilities or 
the possible prejudieing of the security of other coun-
tries, the imposition of a naval bloekade of China might 
raise these questions . 3 In fact, if the United Nations 
could ·get an effective economic blockade, there would be 
less necessity for a naval hindrance of ships entering Ch1-
4 nese ports . 
Bombing Manchur ia 
Among the four proposals made to General Collins , 
General MacArt ur included the bombing of Manchuria. When 
he appeared before Congress in April; he modified this 
suggestion to an advocacy of air reconnaissance over Man-
churia, a mild measure in comparaison to bombing . During 
the hearings he returned to the idea of bombing Chinese ter-
ritory and asserted that bombing the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way would not cause a general war . 5 To ta ke care of the 
Chinese hordes which were then swoopin g down into Korea , 
MacArthur had been given permission to bomb the Korean end 
0£ the bridges over the Yalu . 6 Tbe JCS had also p~oposed 
1Milita.rl situ.t-ion in the Far East, 
2 Ibid ., P• 1865• 5Ibiq. ., p. 1831. 
5Ibid., P• 252 • 6 Ibid., P• 741 • 
._...,.,..., ............ 
pp . 742 and 924. 
4Ibid . ; P• 172?• 
?6 
permitting American planes to engage in "hot pursuit" over 
Chinese territory whenever enemy planes were caught in Ko~ 
rea. Acheson and Truman concurred in the advisability of 
doing this, since, as General Vandenburg had $Uggested; it 
would greatly improve the morale of the pilots.l. The Sec-
retary of State requested the other nations engaged in Ko-
rea to submit their reaction to the question of hot pursuit, 
although reserving the right of the Ur..ited Stat-es to go 
against the general opinion. 2 When Acheson reported to the 
Defense Department the consensus of the allies that United 
Nations planes should s.tay- away from Manehuria, any immedi- · 
ate plans !or continuing flights over Manchuria were dropped., 
By the time this disapproval was received, the Uni-
ted Nations forces were about two hundred miles south o! 
tbe Yalu River, thus leaving plenty of room £or chasing 
Communist planes without going into Manehuria . 4 Aeeording 
to General Vandenburg, . although hot pursuit would have been 
go.od !or morale , wit'h the limited air power avaiiable it 
would not have been decisive in winning the campaign.5 
1!ill•, pp. 11:32 and 1388. 
-'Ibid. ,., PP• 22?8•79. 
-4
:;rbid . 1 p . 507. MacArthur had told TrWllan at Wake 
Island tha£ if the Chinese Communists attacked United Na• 
tions forces, the ai~ foroe would ttslaughtern them (S!12£~• 
p . 45). When the Chinese did counterattack, the air force 
did not halt them (New York 'rimesl May 13, 1951). 
5Ibid . 1 p . 1388. O'Donnell's testim.omy shoved that 
U. s. airmen in Korea had long !elt a sense of !rustration 
at the limitation$ imposed by the policy of limiting the 
war;, in hi$ opinion, never had so many "inordinate" advan-
tages gone to an enemy ln a great conflict (ibid., p, ,105). 
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Washington even forbade the Air Force to bomb the 
North Korean port of Racin .. However, one raid had already 
been carried out when this order was given and a second had 
been diverted because of weather . The State Department ob-
jected to any .further action against the port beeause of 
its location only seventeen miles from the Russian border . 1 
The Joint Chiefs agreed to the validity of this objection; 
in addition, they saw the port's us-efulnesa to the North Ko-
reans as being somewhat limited, since a railroad from Ra-
cin down the coast of Korea had not been completed and 
since Racin was not as good a supply point for the North 
Koreans as was Chongjin . Supplies could be stopped by cut-
ting rail and road lines at a point farther .t'roin Russia. 2 
As .for the question of bombing Manchuria itself, Gen-
eral Collins could discover no speoi.fic request from Ma-e-
Arthur to do so, al~~gh the Far East commander had raised 
the possibility b! such action as early as November? when 
stating 1;hat restri(;tions on United Nations forces had pro-
vided a sanctuary .for the enemr.3 Shortly atter this he 
ind .icated his belief' in the feaeibility of carrying out op-
erations in Korea to p~event rei .nf oreements from crossing 
the Yalu . It was when Collins visited him in December that 
MacArthur requested that he be allowed to bomb Manehnria . 4 
1rus, . , PP • 7.50 and 1063 . 2Ibid . t PP • 750 and 22?5 , 
3Ibi.d . , p. 1288. According to Bradley, this was after 
MacArthur'liad been given permissien to bomb the Korean end 
of the bridges over the Yalu (illg, . , p . 741) . 
4
~., P • 1290 . 
?8 
Administration officials would not admit that the 
United Nations could have attained any great advantage by 
bombing beyond the Yalu. According to Marshall, ground 
.forces may have suffered in a rather remote way from Air 
Force inab1lity to bomb lines of supply an~ arsenals at 
Mukden and Harbin. 1 Although American air power could have 
destroyed many Chinese planes; these planes had really not 
_,,,, 
been very effective in action and had not attacked All ied 
ground troops .. 2 General Collins maintained that for such 
action to be effective, th.e Air Force would . have to bomb 
not only airfields but also warehouses and other buildings 
which were often in towns . 3 
Bradley pointed out the nec ·:.ssity of using the avail- -
able air and naval forces within Korea . Sufficient planes 
and sea era.ft could be gathered for MacArthur's projects 
only by stripping other operations .. 4 Air Force Chief of 
Sta.ff Hoyt Vandenberg spoke of the "shoe-string" Air Force 
whe11 it was viewed in its world-wide commitments. 5 Even 
MacArthur admitted that the air power was not strong enough 
to de:fend both the United States and American troops in 
Europe . 6 According to Vandenburg, all-out use of the air 
forces would n-0t defeat Communist China , although it might 
make the Chinese negotiate . ?- At the time of the hearings , 
l ;&bid. , P• 492 . 2 Ibid . t PP• 492 and 886 . 
5Ibid . • 1246. 4 882 . 5 1393. p . ill2. • -• p . !!219.•' p . 
-6 2874. ? 1389. Ibid .• P • Ibid • . , p . 
- -
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the Air Foree had a Korean s~pply line of about two hundred 
m.il ·es to work -on; and bombi.ng Manchuria would be inadvisa-
ble strictly from a military viewpoint beeause of the dan-
ger oi extending the war . Furthermore, in the advent that 
Russia should enter the war, it would he very difficult to 
l supply troops in Korea or to ge·t them out . 
According to Marshall, the effectiveness of hombing 
supply depots in China would be less than sometimes assert-
ed because the Chinese had cer t ainly dispersed supply de-
pots against the possibility of air attaok . 2 As strategic 
bombing consists normally of at~empt i ng to destroy sources 
of production, it could not be applied to China , for equip• 
ment in Chinese possession came mostly from Rus .sia. Fur-
thermore, the Chinese would be able to repair rapidly any 
damage done.3 
Several witnesses before the committees were not so 
adam.antly ag~nst bombing Manchuria as were Generals Marsh-
all and Bradley. General Wedemeyer agreed with MacApt hur 
that bombing Manchuria was a calculated risk the allies 
should have taken . He also believed th at the d~cision on 
whether to do so or not was rightfully MacArthur's, since a 
"commander in the .field should be given no restrictions 
whatso-ever in carrying out his mission . • • • General 
1Ibi,d . , PP• 888-90 . 2Ibid . 1 P • 617 • 
.?Ibid. , pp . 744 and 965; testimony O·! General Bradley . 
-4Ibid., pp . 2315 , and 2516 . Generals Badger and Barr 
agreed with General Wedemeyer (ipig, t pp~ 2798 and 2958) . 
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O'Donnell believed that we should have bombed Manchuria in 
November 1950. but could not answer whether bombing was 
still .feasible in view of the primary duty o:f maintaining a 
strong Strategic Air Command in a position to guard against 
Russia. 1 
Formosa 
The Joint Chiefs of Sta.ff Viewed MacArthur 's propos al 
!or removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic 
of China with misgivings. Expressing tne belief that "the 
interests of the United States of America coincide with any-
one· who is opposed to Communism,0 MacArthur advocated com-
plete support of the regime. He maintained that al though 
parts of the Formosan government could be aritisized, it 
had no more defects than some other democracies did . 2 
One must look back to 1949 to see the origins of the 
argument over the importance of Formosa and the role it 
eould p1ay in the struggle against Red China'i Two studies 
in September and October of that year had indicated t hat 
economic and diplomatic methods might not be suecess!ul in 
keeping the island in friendly hands. In view of these re-
ports General Wedemeyer suggested minimizing the damage 
!rom the fall of Formosa by explaining the situation over 
the Voice of America . 3 On January}, 1950. the United 
1
~ . , p . 30?2 . 2~.t pp . 111-12. 
'rbid, 1 p. 1672 .. General Wedemeyer asserted that the final po!Icy memorandum had never been referred to him and 
he doubted that it had ever been submitted to the Depart-
ment ot Derense (~ •• PP• 2296-97). Acheson held that 
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Press published an article beginning: 
The United)3tates State Department has noti-
fied its attaches that the loss of Formosa, is-
land redoubt of the Chinese Nationalists, to the 
Communists was to be ant icipated. 
The Department said the public must be sold 
on the idea that the island is of no strategic 
value in order to prevent the loss of prestige at 
home and a bro ad• 
Re!erring to this article, Senator Knowland accused 
certain representatives on l!~ormos-a of following a course 
meant to Ulldermine the Nationalists and of repeatedly send-
ing false reports that the island would fall . He requested 
the names of those who had drawn up the Formosan Document . 
Acheson refused to give them, however, on the grounds that 
all r~sponsibility rested with him as Secretary of State 
and because releasing the names would increase the I'eluct-
ance of officers in the State :Department to work in certain 
controversial areas where they might be aecus(;3d of unortho-
dox ideas. 1 As a justification for putting forth the For-
mosan Document, Acheson spoke of a necessity of minimiz~ng 
the importance of a territory which might be lost. 2 He at-
tempted to explain the meaning behind several controversial 
statements in the document . Referring to the phrase 
41largely because of a mistaken importance to the United 
States defense in the Pacific ," Acheson denied that this 
meant that the island was of no strategic importance. It 
the Interdepartment Coordinating Staff, including represent-
atives of the Army, CIA, and ECA, had seen the document 
without making any suggestions to alter it(~., P• 1828). 
l~"' pp. 1675-7? and 1683. 2 Ibid., P• 16?3. 
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was intended to counteract the effect of talk that the loss 
of Formosa would be catastrophic to the security of the 
United States and would throw the defense line back to the 
California coast. In reality• all means short of employing 
American troops would have been used to prevent the fall of 
Formosa~~ Acheson summarized American policy toward Taiwan 
from 1948 until the invasion of South Korea: (1) Formosa 
had strate g ic importance for America, (2) the island should 
be kept out of' the hands of a hostile power, and (3) under 
existing conditions it was not possible to promise to com-
mit United States forces to Formosa. 2 
Official policy changed in June 1950. On the twenty-
fifth of that month President Truman announced our deter-
mination to prevent an invasion of Formosa from the main-
land .. 3 He ordered the Seventh Fleet to Formosan waters to 
nneutralize" the isl and and called on Chinese Nationalist 
fa.roes to cease air and sea operations against the main-
land., On the other hand, the State Department informed 
MacArthur that if Chiang Kai-sbek offered troops, he should 
re:fuse them .. The army o.r Taiwan was needed on the isle.nd 
1Ibid . , pp . 1804-05 . A debate over whether the For-
mosan Document should be published ended with Acheson los-
ing his fight against publication. Maintaining that he had 
furnished the document to the committees with the under-
standing that it would not go into the public record, Ache-
son pointed to the possibility of Russia using the official 
document as a way o.f -di_scredi ting the Voice of itmerica. 
Sinoe a summary bad already been released, it appears that 
. Acheson was thinking of the damage an of i'icial release 
would do to the administration . 
2 
~ . , PP• 16?1-?2 . 
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to defend it against th Chinese Reds in the event that 
they should attack. 1 
After General MacArthur visited the island of For-
mosa. in July, 2 he made several recommendations on arms and 
equipment needed by the Formosans. He did not recommend 
using the troops in Korea o After the Chinese invasion of 
Korea , nevertheless, he began to blame failures in the pen-
insula on the fact that Chinese Nationalist troops were not 
being used. According to MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek's 
forces had improved ., and, with so many Chinese Communists 
in Korea, it was unlikely that Peiping would mount an of-
fensive against Taiwan.3 
1
.Phere were several reasons advanced by the Joint 
Chiefs for their opposition to using Formosan troops in 
Korea . According to Marshall, th~re was a continued need 
for armed protection of the Formosan island. As late as 
March 1951 a icission sent to Formosa had pictured the 
troops as ill-prepared for battle. Since some of our al-
lies no longer recognized the Nationalist government• they 
might well not welcome the idea of this government's troops 
fighting in Korea or engaging in diversionary activities 
from Indo-China . If tµe Chinese went to the mainland in 
junks, as MacArthur suggested, 4 the United States might 
1Goodrich, PP• 110-11, questions the wisdom of send-
ing the Seventh Fleet to patrol the waters between the is-
land and the mainland when many of the countries in the UN 
did not recognize the Nationalist regime. 
2su;era, pp . 59--61. 3Ibid., PP• a4;:...a5. 
4 Ibid., p. 24. 
84 
well become involved in fighting in China, for the Nation-
ali.5 t army would re quire more logistical support and better 
trained troops to carry out successful campaign on the 
ma1nland . 1 One had to consider, too, the possibility that 
the .ussians would picture any return of the Nationalists 
to the mainland as a causus belli and would more actively 
support the Red Chinese . 
The Military and the Civilian 
If the Joint Chiefs o! Staff had to take more factors 
into consideration when making a decision than did Mac-
.Arthur, so did the President and the State Department have 
to weigh other interests when making and carrying out poli-
cies . The proper roles of the Departments of Defense and 
State in making decisions were important subjects discussed 
during the hearings . The role of Congress in declaring war 
and in sending troops abroad i:raised partisan debate, a.a did 
the state of prePiredness of the country and the question 
of universal military training . 
Although General MacArt ur agreed that "at no time in 
our system of sovernment is there any question of the eivil 
a.dministrat i on ·being in complete control,n he also asserted 
that "there should 'be no non-professional interference in 
the handling of troops in a campaign . "'2 If this bands-off 
619 . 
1
~., p. 164; testimony of Bradley; cf . pp . 33? and 
2Ibid ., p. 289; cf . Wedemeyer's statement on a com-
mandingofficer's role in carrying out his mission (~uEra , 
p . 79) . 
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attitude on the part of civilians were carried out in a 
war, the role of the President as chief of state would be 
infringed upon . The idea that military plans can be car-
ried out without being adapted to the diplomatic situation 
ignores the political connotations of some military actions, 
such as the bombing of cities . 
Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued definite or-
ders on any problem which might lead to political reper-
cussions , they asked tbe opinion of the State Department on 
the question at hand . 1 Louis Johnson had found his prede-
cessor as Secretary of Defense , James Forrestal• concerned 
about the domination of the State Department over Defense . 
However , after a system of liaison between the two depart-
ments bad been set up, Acheson was , in Johnson's opinion, 
very cooperative in carrying out joint planning . 2 As a 
result of consultations , the political factor might be the 
determinant, for instan ce in the decision not to bomb near 
the Manchurian border,' but this was decided be!ore an or-
der was given, not by changing directives .4 In question .a 
where there was a difference of opinion between tate and 
· 
1Ibid. , p . 898 ; t~stimony of General Bradley . A di-
rective-roMaeArthur from the JCS was supposed to contain 
only military material . When political reasonings entered 
the picture, it was the President who communicated with 
MacArthur; thus, Truman included political decisions in his 
note to the general on January 13, 1951, which had been ex-
cluded from the January 12 message(~ . , p . 905) . 
2 Ibid., 
4 . 
Ibi9- . , 
Acheson . 
3 · pp . 257? and 2594 . Ibid . , P• 502 . 
-
pp. 740 and 1760 ; testimony or Bradley and 
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Defense, Marshall could not recall any instance where tbe 
Commander in Chief had acted adversely to the Department of 
Defense in relation to the State Department . 1 
fl tar's very object is victory, not prolonged inde-
cision. In war, indeed, there ean be no substitute for 
victory." In these words,. General MacArthur expressed the 
military strategist ' s view that one side or the other must 
win a war. The concept of limited war in which the armed 
forces attempt only to prevent the enemy .from making ad-
vances was alien to the American idea of success, notwith-
standing the .fact that the War ot 1812 was one in which 
neither side won. Although Republicans often stated that 
a cessation of hostilities with the Communists in control 
of territory north of the thirty-eigth parallel would be a 
victory for the enemy, 2and some pe•ople still state that we 
lost the war in Korea , i t seems to many others. including 
this writer, that by preventing the Communists from making 
territorial gains, the West achieved a victory . 
1
~ . , P• 384 . 
2see conclusion of Repub l ican Senators to this e.f!ect 
(ibid., P• 3605). 
-
CHAPTER VI 
OTHER NATIONS AND KOREA 
Russia and the Korean War 
In deciding what measure s sho uld be taken against 
Communist China, t he allies bad to consider what Russia 
would do, especially in view of a 1950 Sino-Russian treaty. 
·1n this pact Russia and Ohina promised to prevent the ure-
petition of aggression and violation of peace on t he part 
of Japan or any other state which should unite vlith Japan, 
directly or indirectly, i n a.ots of aggressi,,n ·. 111 Russia 
might construe this treaty to denounce even , the flying of 
airplanes fro~ Japan to carry on the struggle against China 
2 as an aggressive act, if she so wanted. 
Douglas MacArthur re.fused to speculate on whether 
bombing Manchuria would require Russia to carry out the 
assistance called for by the alliance. He countered by 
declarin g t hat losses in Korea. could not go on .forever. 
There was no certainty that Russia would stay out or come 
in .; on t hese t hings t he country had to take a certain 
. k 3 ris , Indeed, the Soviet Union seemed to be less and less 
2!!2!g_. ,. p . 406; testimony of Marshall. 
'Ibid., p. 66; cf. P• 40 where MacArthur states his 
recommeru!ations might not confine t he conflict to Korea, but 
8? 
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linked with the Korean War. 1 Moreover, even while receiv-
ing air assistance and supplies, the Chinese might not want 
. 2 Bonet .forces in their country. For one thing, China 
wanted Manchuria to remain part of her territory, a status 
which might be endangered i! Russians were admitted on a 
large scale to China proper. As for American designs on 
Manchuria. Mao rthur did not believe that a bombing of that 
territory would alter t he fact that Russia knew that we had 
no imperialist designs there.3 
The· administration did not agree witr .' MaoArtbur• s 
rather sanguine view of t he possibility of Ru$sian entrance 
into t he war . President Truman had decided that the risk 
of war from bombing r>1anehuria was too great. The Soviet 
Union and Communist China had called attention to the treaty 
between them 1n conneetion with Korea and the alle ged re-
armament o! Japan. Also, 11' Russia failed to live up to the 
terms of the treaty. her influence i:n the Far East would 
possibly be threatened,. This was true eve ·n if the ter'!l.s of 
the treaty were vague enough for the Russians to interpret 
it as they wished. 4 
That Russia would not necessarily respond to aetion 
on the part of the United States was. according to Acheson, 
one 0£ two assumptions made by MacArthur in drawing up his 
that tney would give us an opportunity to bit the enemy be-
fore he hit us . 
g. 
~ • t p. 480; testimony o.f Marshall; e! .• p. 741, 
testimcn,y o! Bradley . 
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program. The administration, however, was aware of three 
actions which the Kremlin might initiate: (l) turning over 
to the Chinese large numbers of planes with crews for re-
taliatory aetion, (2) intervening in Korea with a half mil-
lion or more ground "volunteers," and(:~) precipitation of 
an all-out war. 1 MacArthur 's second assumption was that 
time was not necessarily on our aide in the building up of 
armed. strengtb.. In contrast to this idea, the administra-
tion did believe that ti me was on our side, not that we 
would match the Soviet Un.ion "man for man and tank for tank,u 
but that we could build an effective deterrent force. 2 
The hearings brought forth som~ comments on Russian 
aid in the Korean War. Many of the statements on this sub-
j ec.t were deleted on seeuri ty grounds from the published 
testimony. Nevertheless, General MacArthur did state that 
the attack on South Korea c ould not h~ve been launched by 
the North Koreans without supplies furnished by the Soviets} 
Bradley answered questions o! Senator Harry Byrd with state-
ments that MIG 15'a, fast Russian -bu;i.lt jets, were used to 
combat United Nations approaches to the Yal.u and that tanks 
and most of th artillery were o.f Russian manufacture. 4 
Both General MacArthur and General Brad ley spoke ot 
the difficulty of. di8eovering exactly how much influence 
. l 
Ibid ., pp . 1718-19 . General Bradl ey testified to 
Russian-;r!lingness to go ·to war on PP• ?.51 and 942. 
2
~ • • P• 1720. '~•t P• 17} . 
4 
~•, p., 995; cf. testimony o! M.ar$hall, P• 623 . 
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Russia had on China in 1950 and 19.51.1 Marshall was more 
positive on this point when he stated , "I have 5one on the 
assumption that she [ Chinaj was operating not only in con-
j unction with but literally under the direction of the So-
viet Union . 0 ·2 Alth ough Russia and China were acting to-
gether in Korea, Acheson mentioned the continued State De-
partment consideration 0£ a possible s ·11t between the two 
powerful countries.' Indeed, as Bradley pointed out, no 
i1. 
country had been able to dominate China very long,_ · 
In considering measures which might be taken in Korea, 
the administration had to keep in mind the rela.ti -ve stre ·ngth 
o.r the United States and of Russia. Here again there was 
disagreement with MacArthur . The general firmly believed 
that the Soviet government had not stockpiled su.ffieient ma-
terial in Siberia to maintain a major aggressive campaign 
in Asia for any length of time.5 General Sherman showed 
hi.msel.f to be in sympathy with this view of Russian strength 
when he stated that the real deterrent to Russian aggres -
sion was the fear of being soundly beaten .6 In refuting 
this estimate of Russian strength, Marshall assumed a Rus-
sian possession of the A-bomb, an increasing relative mili-
tary power• and a growing e£fieiency of weapons . 7 
1J]l~ .,. pp. 144 and 1001. 
2 
. ~ ., p . 659. Acheson also expressed a belie£ in a 
closer conneetion between Communist China and the Kremlin 
than Mac.Arthur saw (ibid., p . 1923). 
3Ibid. • P • 1 1776. 4 Ibid., p . 1001. .5Ibid. ,. p. 130. 
6
~., P • 1.568 0 ?_!lli . , PP • ?175-76. 
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The United Nations in Korea 
In deciding what measures could be taken in Korea, 
the United Nations technically had the major role. In re-
ality, the United St ates had the real power of decision, 
tempered by its desire to keep the support of its allies. 
Sinee there was no Military Staff Committee in the United 
Nations. President Truman became the agent for all the 
eountries, 1 Although the United States was to carr y out 
United Nations resolutions on Korea, it did not always act 
in pursuance of a UN resolution . On several occasions, 
e.g. on July 7 and October?, the American government acted 
previous to or at tne same time it was seeking approval for 
an aotion. 2 
General Marsha l l explained the official line o~ com-
mand for orders going to Korea. From general United Nations 
resolutions the JCS prepared a "precise directive,_H taking 
into consideration all the military involvements and impli-
cations. Directives were .rorwarded to the ... ecretary ot De-
£ense and the Pres ident,_ and i£ very important, to the Na-
tional Security Council. Any political questions involved 
were discussed with members 0£ the State Department . 
MacArthurts reports originally went through the JCS 
on their way to the United Nations . Later, wben reporting 
exclusively on military operations, the United Nati.ons 
Supr eme Commander reported directly to the international 
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body . 1 Generally this worked well . Nevertheless, accord-
ing to Acheson, General MacArthur overstepped his authority 
in his twelfth report to the United Nations by stating his 
own views in what was supposed to be a "factual recitation 
of military events . " When acArthur denied the validity of 
-
State Department objections ·, the report was .forwarded to 
the United Nations . 2 
Dean fl .. eheson believed strongly in the ne-cessi ty of 
maintaining international support for actions in Korea, 
since they were being taken in the name of the United Na-
tions . 3 Because the main resolutions o! the world body • 
were in support of a vigorous war against aggression in Ko• 
rea, they were little discussed in the hearings . However, 
several Senators did attack an Indian resolution of January 
11 1 1951, callin g for a five -member grou p to consider 
cease-fire proposals and an armistice . The Soviet Union• 
the United States, Great Britain, Communist China, and one 
other country were to be on the committee . The Senators 
claim .ad that the proposal made the concessions of disc us-
sing Formosa and of recognizing Red China by includin g her 
on the committee . Senator Knowland referred to an ar tic le 
in the New York Times in which it was stated that Ambassa-
dor Austin had voted for the resolution in expectation of a 
Chinese Communist refusal to see the committee. According 
to Knowland, this had been a dangerous wager because of the 
1
~. , P• 989. ~~. , Po 1981 . 
3~ . , PP• 1940- 41. 
. 93 
poss.ibility of an acceptanee. 1 In Acheson's opinion the 
eeas.e-fire proposal did not promise Formosa _and China to 
the Communists. It was meant to say merely "if you people 
stop your defiance of t~e United Nations , then you will 
have the chance to disouss, as you had a chance be.fore this 
de!iance , these questions in which you are interested." He 
f'urther averred that although we did not consider these 
questions part o! the Korean situation, we could not pre- · 
vent other people discussing them . 2 Acheson CQUld find 
nothing in the proposal which indicated. how many nations 
would confer on the cease-fire• and we should have insisted 
on the inclusion o! Nationalist China in any discussion 
group. 3 
Another subject involving the United Nat ions was the 
seating of Red Cbina in the United r ations . Part of the 
discussion centered on whether Communist China's entrance 
was a prooedura.l question not subject to the veto . Acheson 
spoke of our hope .of keeping the Red regime out of the 
United Nation$ by a majority vote. If evidence showed that 
a minority supp.ortedour poeiti<,n 1 we would request an 
1Ibid _., P • 523. 
2 Ibid . , p .• 1784• According to Marshall, the JCS had 
recommended the omission of thes .e questions from the cease-
fire discussions. However. they made no recommendation ae 
to a discussion or the -se questions in a !inal settlement, a 
suggestion made in the .fifth principal o!' tb.e Indian reso• 
lution. 
3 . ¼~;\~•, p . 1969. The proposals a.re outlined on page 
196? of the hearings . 
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opinion of t he World Court on the Charter provision that 
the Republic of China should be the permanent member of the 
Security Council . 1 If a veto of the admission was being 
considered , an opinion of the World Court on record that 
the entrance of I taly was a vetoable question could be 
taken into consideration . 2 
The Allies 
Not all member nations of the United Nations fought 
in Korea . Of course, Russia and her satellites opposed all 
United Nations actions to deal with the aggressor . Others 
made no contribution of manpower or material . But there 
were sixteen countries which sent units to fi ght with 
American and Korean troops • During the hearings Senators 
repeatedly questioned the contributions of these countries . 
Were they contributing their share of men and material? 
Were they too anxious to c~mpromise with the aggressor and 
with Russia? Had the allies put pressure on t he adminis-
tration to remove MacArthur? Was the administr at ion favor-
ing Europe at t he expense of Asia? 
Many Senators pictured the allies as not doing as 
much as t hey could to support the Korean War . Although 
military officials appearing before the commit tees gener -
al l y agreed with this judgment, the Secretaries of State and 
Defense pointed to some of the reasons for this. Acheson 
-----------------------------------------1Ibid . , :p. 2023 . enator Smith opposed Communist 
China•s~rance into the UN because Russia was in control 
there and this ire ant a conquest by an external power. 
2 !ill · , p. 2024- . 
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spoke of the allies as 1'painfully aware'' of the inability 
to do all they -would like to do. For some time the Bri-
tish had been carrying on guerilla warfare in Malaya, 
while France had been struggling to maintain her position 
in Indo-Cbina. 1 Marshall mentioned the inability of some 
countries to do more because of internal political issues. 2 
In October 1950 the United States might even have 
discouraged other nations from sending troops, _ since we 
considered tl ·1e war near an end. Then too, we had turned 
down some o!fers of less than a. thousand troops, for Mac-
Arthur had request -ad that all units accepted ha.v-e at lea.st 
this many men. Furthermore, w-hen the United States would 
ha.ve had to furnish all equipment, training, transportation, 
and logistical support !or the troops offered, they were 
not accepted.3 
Secretary of State Acheson did not think the allies 
were too anxious to compromise. The foreign ministers of 
the United States, France, and Great Britain had diseuased 
the importance 0£ limiting the war and were in full accord 
on major measures in Korea. 4 On the other hand, when Col-
lins was asked whether the- allies were giving us .full sup-
port throug ,'1 · approval of our actions, his answer was that 
he did not think they we1.•e supporting us to the extent they 
should.,.? 
P• 1?72. 2 Ib.;d - P• 607--:...•, . 
PP• 950 and 980-81. 
P• 1225. 
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MacArthur held tha.t.- if necessary, the United States 
should go it alone in Korea; he believed, however, that his 
p lans .for victory would be support ·ed by a majorit y of the 
United Nations. 1 If to help an ally were in the American 
interest. the country should do so; i! to .help an ally ran 
contrary to American interest, the country should not do 
so. 2 This point of view did not accord with Bradley's idea 
that propaganda, not military might, would help the United 
States to win the war. T·o win in this field the Anlerica.n 
governmen t wou.ld have to cooperate with other nations hav-
ing the same ideals and. objectives. 3 
As for alleged pressure from other countries to re .... 
move MacArthur , Acheson asserted that they had opposed tbe 
Supreme Commander•s policies several times and were wor-
ried about some of bis statements. 4 There had, however, 
been no pressure brought on the administrat ion to replace 
the general as leader of the United Nations troops.5 Af-
ter his removal, the New York Times re ported a general 
approval of Truman•s actien by the allies, with a consensus 
that it should have taken place earlier. 6 
Europe versus Asia 
During World War II General MacArthur often com-
plained of the administration's policy of trying to bring 
l 2 Ibid., pp. 168 and 296. Ibid., P• 108. 
3
~., P• 730. 4 Ibid., P• 1733 ► 5Ibid., P• 1879. 
6N~w York ~ime§t April 12, 1951. 
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the war in Europe to a finish before giving all~-0ut supp rt 
to h.is forces in t he Paci.!ic. 1 During the Korean War he 
voiced the same complaint. He disagreed with the policy or 
holding a large number of troops in Europe under t he suppo-
sition that Russia' · s real aim was to conquer these indus-
trial countries. With this in mind he had written to 
Congressman Martin this comment: 
It seems stran ge ly difficult !or some to re-
alize that here in Asia is where the Communist 
conspirators have elected to make their play for 
global conquests, and tha t we have joined the is-
sue thus raised on the battlefield; tb at here we 
fi ght Europe's war with arms whil.e the diplomats 
the:re st -ill f igllt it with words; that if we lose 
the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe 
is inevitable,. win it and Europe most pro~ably 
would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. 
Generals Marshall and Bradley held that Russia's main 
goal was to achieve domination over Europe klnd that the 
United States must ensure the freedom o.f that vital area. 
Europe 's manpower of three hundred million and her great 
industrial capacity made her . the bulwark against communism? 
Air bases on the continent were e&sential ior maintaining 
a striking power which could reach industrial ei ties -o.f · the 
Soviet Union . Moreover, if' the United States lost Europe , 
it would lose Middle .East oil, bases, and strategic mater-
ials. 4 Added to the communi$t bloc, these reseurze ·s would 
greatly increase Russia's strength as an opponent.5 
1courtney Whitney, MacArthur: Mis Ren~ezvoua wi'th 
!fistorz (New York: Alfred" A"- Knopf' Co.; I9Sg}, PP• '3&,;-37. 
2N11itm; .. §.it1;1ation in t'he Far East, P• ~544~ 
3;tR!~•, p. 7.31, 4Ibid., p. 88}. 5rbid., p. 742. 
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General MacArthur admitted during the bearings th at 
perhaps he did not know all the factors which led the ad-
ministration to place such a stress on Europe. lihen Sena -
tor McMahon expressed a desire to know how MacArthur would 
defend t he American nation, Mae.Arthur replied, "That 
doesn 't happen to be my responsibility, Sena.tor . My re-
sponsibilities were in t he Pacific, and 'the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the various agencies of the government are work-
ing day and ni ght !or an over-all solution to the global 
problem !11 
1 Ibid ., p. ?6. 
-
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The committee hearings ended on June 2?, 1951, 
almost two months and over two mi llion words after their 
beginning . On August 17 the two committees convened once · 
more and adopted a .resolution to transmit the hearings,. 
records, and appendices to the Senate without filing a 
report or reaching any conclusions. Neve~theless, members 
could submit their pr ivate views to the chairman, Subse-
quently. a group of Republicans .filed .a long and virulent 
report . 1 In a summary of witnesses• testimony, t hese Re-
publi~ans pointed to the testimony of Vice Admiral Badger 
as conclusive evidence that a United States failure to 
r 
provide arms caused the downfall o! the Republic of China• 
alth ough admitting that General Barr contradicted this 
view. General Hurley's testimony supported the thesis 
that Yalta was one of the greatest tragedies in our his-
tory, while General o•Donnell estimated the Air Force of 
being capable o.f carrying out MacArthur's suggestion o.r 
----------------------------1 Republic ans signing the report were Style Bridges , 
Alexander \t/iley. H. Alexande:i:- Smith , Bourke B. Hioken-
looper, llilliam F. Knowland, Harry P. Cain, Owen Brewster, 
and Ralph Flanders . 
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bombing Manchuria . They thus claimed vindication of their 
point of view . In their opinion, little could be learned 
from the testimony of General Bradley or the Joint Chiefs , 
since it would have been embarrassing for them to contra-
dict the Secretary of Defense or to oppose administration 
policy . 
These epublicans outlined thirty areas of "agree -
mentn representing 11common-sense conclusions which anyone 
regardless of politica l party would draw after the facts 
hacl een set forth . 11 The preface to these items read, "The 
conviction that the administration ' s Far East policy was 
one of appeasement to~ard communism was proven to be fact 
as a result of the investigation . " This statement is indi-
cative of the tone of the rest of the report . The adminis-
tration might well have agreed with the judgment of the 
Sena tors in a few of the areas , e . g ., that the President 
had the right to remove General ~acArthur • that MacArthur 
never violated military directives, that the recommendati ons 
offered by the general were based on his desire to bring 
about a victory . Other of the n agreements" were. slanted in 
such a way that they conveyed a criticism of the adminis-
tration's policy, e . g ., that the milit ary potential of the 
United States after World War II was not maintained at a 
level commensurate with our political committments or 
financial expenditures and that limited war is impossible 
to defin~ . 1 
-------·---~------------------
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A!ter condemning the administration in its post-war 
Far East policy and accusing the State Depc>.rtment o.f har-
boring Communists, the Senators supported a greater use of 
the air and naval forces by .following MaeArthur' ,s recom-
mendations. They contended that this would ensure the vic-
tory which the "immoral pelicy of killing more Chinese 
Communists" was not likely to produee. 1 
In their conclusion, t he Republican Senators ex-
pressed the belie.f that a peace based on t he division of 
Korea at the th i rty-eighhh parallel would be a victory £or 
aggression ,. 2 In a separate statement Henry Cabot Lodge, Jn 
agreed with the committee report on most questions, but 
placed more empha.sis on the ' Korean War. 3 In a much more 
reason.able report Senator Saltonstall agreed with most or 
the eonclusions of the other Republican Senators, but not 
with the bases on which they had been predicated. He also 
emphasized a point completely i gnored by his colleagues-
that General MacArthur's statements caused considerable 
doubt in t he world as to his support of the , United Nations• 
policies. He correctly judged the importance of the hear-
ings in influencin g t he administration on the importance of 
(1) keepin g Formosa out of Communist hands , (2) lceeping 
Red China out of the United Nations, and (3) indefinitely 
delayin g American recognition 0£ Communist China. 4 
l Ibj.d ., p. 3590. 2 1.2.li·• , pp . 3600-05 . 
:;Ibid., P•· 3659 . 4-l;bid . , PP• 3659-60. 
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Wayne Morse, still a Republican at this ti e , showed 
his independence by criticizing the Republican report as 
"very highly partisan and biased•" especially in avoiding 
a discussion of whether MaeArthur•s conduct justified his 
removal . In Morse's opinion• it did, especially because 
of MacArthur ' s ultimatum to the Chinese leaders to · 111eet 
with him to negotiate a pe~ee . Although deploring the 
emphasis Republicans put on the ousting of the Nationalists 
from Oh.ina proper, he thought the Democrats should have 
insisted on greater control or the aid they gave to the 
f-Iationalists . 1 
Democrats. had no general report on th ., hearings . 
They were content to let the hearings themsel Yes rest as 
evidence of Truman's justification in recalling MacArthur . 
There was general praise of the way in which Senator 
Russell had conducted the hearin gs . 
Results of the hearings were both good and bad fer 
the country . Arthur Krock pointed out s ome 0£ these results 
in an article written shortly before the end of the sessions . 
MaeArthur 1 s testimony led to protests against t he shipment 
ot strate gic materials to Communist China and an embargo on 
t hese goods i mposed by the United l'lations . The reasons for · 
which the administr ation had dismissed MacArthur were 
clearer, althou gh it was evident that the abrupt manner in 
whi~h he was dismissed was ill-advised . 2 
l~-, P• 3662. 
2New York Times, June 1, 1951. 
--·----- -
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The hearings also necessitated a review of Korean War 
strategy . They resulted in positive statements by the 
United States that we would oppose Chinese Communist admis-
sion to the United Nations . Truman ' s determination to 
contain the war was clearer and this forcefulness removed 
an excuse for the allies not to contribute more to Korea on 
the pretext of disapproving of General MacAfth~ tactics 
and disbelief in the President's ability to control him . 1 
That the nation wanted peace and desi:r•ed above all to avoid 
a third world war was demonstrated time and time again. As 
!or the conservative Republican views on Korea, the tran-
scripts revealed how illogical was the position of favoring 
MacArthur ' s proposals and at the same time advocating reduo -
tionsin the number of troops and the amount of money being 
spent to carry on the war . 
The hearings were harmful in several respects . Brad-
ley had testified during the hearings that the prolonged 
probe of the military situation was endangering the United 
States and that the military disclosures might incite an 
attack by the Russians in other spots of the world. 2 It 
was undoubtedly true that the Russians could glean much 
information from the published reports. Several articles 
in the New York Times pointed out what these areas were . 
The full picture of the division of opinion over Korea be-
tween the United States and its allies, as well as between 
1Ibid . , .\)ril. 26 , 1951 . 
2Milit§U7 ituation in ~he Far East , p. 953. 
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MacArthur and the administration. was shown. The vague-
ness of future policy, as charged by the Republicans, was 
revealed, along with tre tact that we did not consider our~ 
selvesEtrong enough to wage a successful war on a lar ger 
. 1 
scale.. This vagueness au to future action stemmed par-
tially from our lack of concrete knowledge of actual 
conditions behind the Iron Curtain. Our admission that we 
were attempting to kill as many Chinese as possible and 
that we had many casualties gave impetus to the Russian 
propaganda machine . 2 
On the other handt several predicted results of the 
dismissal did not oeour . Forecasts of a harmful effect on 
the Japanese peace treaty negotiations resulting from the 
removal. did not materialize . Immediately after MacArthur's 
departure from Japant John Foster Dulles informed the 
Japanese government that our policy had not changed. There 
were, subsequently, no great obstacles in coming to an 
agreement on what the treaty should contain, 3 General 
Ridgway took command of the Far East theater and carried 
out his mission e£fectively. 
Thus the administration's ·decision to remove Mac-
Arthur had passed be.fore · the "high court of publ i c opinion , 0 
as the general himself said it would have to . 4 In spite 
1New York Times 1 May 27 , 1951 . 
2 Ibid .. , May 13, 1951 . 
-3m11tarz Situatiop in tbe,Far E~~t• P • ?52. 
4 Ibid . , p . 102 . 
-
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of the initial uproar over the wey the dismissal notice 
had been given and the tumultuous reception given Mac-
Arthur on his return to the United States, Truman's views 
on limiting the war were justified and were followed .by 
tbe succeeding Republican administration . 
APPENDIX 
Message .from Joint C·hie.fs of Staff to General 
MacArthur on December 6, 1950 
6 Deco, '50 
From Joint Chiefs of Staff · to Commander-in-Chief, Far E st, 
Tokyo, Japan (and other commanders): · 
1 . The Pr esident, as of 5 Dee. , forwarded a memo te all 
Cabinet members and to the chairman n.s.R.B., administr tor 
E.C.A. , director a.I.A., administrator E.S.A. and director 
Selective Service, which reads as follows: I 
. lfin the light of the present critical internation~l 
situation, and until further written notice from me, I ~ish 
that each one of you would take immediate steps to redu9e 
the number of pu blic speeches pertaining to foreign or il-
itacy policy made by officials of ·t he departments and a en-
cies of th e Executive Branch. This applies to official in 
t _he field as well as t hose in Washington . 
11No speech, press release, or other pub lic stateme t 
concernin g foreign policy should be released until it ha 
received clearance from the Depi."tment of Sta te. } 
"No speech, pl;"ess re ,lease, or other statement con-
cernin g military policy should be released until it has 
received clearance from the Dei;artment of Defense. 
11 In addition to the copies submitted to the Depart 
ents of St ate and Defense for clearance, advance copies of 
speeches and press releases aoncernimg foreign policy or 
military policy should be submitted to the White House fr 
information . 
"The purpose of t his memerandum is not to cu rta · iL he 
f low .of informat~on to the American P:ople, but rat her tj1 
insure that t he in.form at i _ on ma.de public is accurate and 
fully in accord with t he policies of t he Unit ed Stat es G v-
ernment. ' -
2. He also forwarded the following to the Secretary f 
State and Secretary of Defense: 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
"Officials overseas, including military commanders 
and diplomatic represe -ntatives, should be ord ered to exe -
cibe ex trem e caution in public statements, to clear all t 
routine statements with their departments, and to r~frai 
from di r ect communieation on military or foreign policy w·th 
newspapers, magazines, or ot her publicity media in the 
United States. 
3. The above is transmit ed to y ou for guidance and 
app ropriate action . 
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Excerpts from President Truman's April 
11 Address to the Nation 
The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack 
on peace in the Far East . It was t he Soviet Union that 
trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. The 
Chinese Communists massed forty-four well-trained and w 11-
equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. These were he 
troops they threw into battle when t he North Korean Com1 u-
nists were beaten. 
The question we have had to face is whether t he C 
nist plan of conquest can be stopped without general w • 
Our Government and other countries associated with us i 
the United t1ations believe that the best chance or stop ing 
it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea ald 
def e~t it there. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • We do net want to see the conflict in Korea exten ed. 
We are trying to prevent a world war• -not to start one. 
The best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the 
other free countries will conti nue to resist the attack. 
But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to 
punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China 
itself? Why don 't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to 
land on the mainland of China? 
If we were to do these things we would be running a 
very gra ve risk of starting a general war . If th at were to 
happen, we would have brou ght about the exact situation e 
are trying to prevent. 
If we were to do these things, we would become ent -
gled in a. vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our 
task would become immeasurably more difficult all overt e 
world . 
. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
First of all, it is cle~ t hat our efforts in Kore 
can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue 
the strug gle. The United Iations forces have put up at 
mendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy cas -
alties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than tiey 
have been before. These are plain facts which may disco r-
. e the Chinese Communists from continuin g their attack . 
Second, the free world as a whole is growing in mi i-
tary strength every day. In the United States, in ~esteJn 
Europe, and t hrou ghout the world, free men are a lert to ~he 
Soviet t hreat and ar e building their defenses. This may 
discourage t he Communist rulers from continuing th e war n 
Korea--and from undertaking new acts o.f aggression else-
where. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I believe that · we must try to limit the war i n Kor a 
£or t hese vital reasons: to make sure that the precious 
lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the 
security · of our country and the free world is not needles . ly 
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jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war . 
A number of events have made it evident that Gene al 
MacArthur did not agree with that policy o I have thereto.re 
considered it essential to relieve General Mac.Arthur so 
that there would be no doubt or confusion as to t he rea 
purpose and aim of our policy . 
It was with the deepest pe rsonal regret that I fond 
myself compelled to take t his action . General MacArthu is 
one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause o.f 
world peace is more important than any individual. 
Excerpts from Address of General MacArthur to 
Joint Meeting of Congress on April 19 
Mr. President, Mr. Sµeaker, distinguished Members of 
the Congress, I stand on this rostrum with a sense of d 
humility and great pride; humility in the wake of those 
great American architects of our history who have stood 
here before me; pride in the re!lectiori that this forum 
legislative debate represents human liberty in the pure 
form yet devised . [Applause~ 
Here arc centered the hopes, and as pirations, and 
faith of the entire human race ~ 
I do not sta nd he re as advocate for any partisan 
cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite be 
yond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be 
resolved on. the Aighest plane of national interest if ou 
course is to prove sound and our .future protected. I t1st, 
thex-efore, that you will do me the justice o.f receiving hat 
which I have to . say as solely expressing t Le consi der ed 
viewpoint of a fellow American .. I address you with eit~e r 
rancor nor bi t terness in t he fading twilight of life wit~ 
but one purpose in mind, to serve my countryo (Applause~ 
The issues are global and so i nterlocked that to c n-
sider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of 
another is but to court disaster for the whole . 
While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway o 
Europe, ·tis no less true :;nat Europe is the gateway to 
Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to 
have its impact upon the other. 
There are those who claim our strength is inadequa 
to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our eff 
I can think of no 0reat e r expression o.f_defeatism. (Ap-
plausetl If a potential enemy can divide his strength o 
two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. 
• • e • • • • · • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • e • • Our strate g ic frontier then shifted to embrace the 
entire Pac ific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect s 
as lon g as we held it. · Indeed, it acts as a protective 
shield .for all of t he Americas and all free lands of the 
Pacific Ocean area. We control it to t he shores of Asia 
a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians 
to the Marianas held by us and our free allies. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • f • • • • 
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The holdi ng of t his littoral defense line in the 
western Pacific is entirely dependent upon hol din g all 
segments t hereof, for any major breach of that li ne by 
unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined I 
at tack every other se gment. 
This is a military es t ima t e as to which I have yetj to 
find a militar y leader who will take exception. CApplau~11lse:} 
For that reason I have s t ron gl y reco mmended in the 
past as a matter of military urgency t hat under no ci · · -
stances must Formosa .fall und er Communist control. (Appl use'J 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . 
While I .,;as not consulte d prior to the President• s 
decision to in ter vene i n support of the Republic of Kore , 
t ha t decision, from a military standpoint, proved a soun 
one. As I say, it prove .d. a sound one• as we hurled back 
the invader and decimated bis f orces. Our victory was 
complete and our obJe-etives- within reach when Red China 
intervened with numerically superior ground f orces. 
This created a new war and an an entirely new situ ticn 
not conte mplated when our forces were committ ed again s t he 
North Korean invaders, a sit uation wh:tch called for new 
decisions in t he diplomatic sphere to permit the realist c 
adjustment of military stra t egy. 
Such decisions have not been forthcoming. 
While no man in his right mind would advocate send 
ing our ground forces into continental China, and such w s 
never given a thou ght, the new situation did ur gently de aid 
a drastic revision o! strate gic planning if our politica 
aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated t he ld. 
Apart f r om t he military ne ed, as I saw it, to neu-
tralize the sanctuary protection given t he enemy north o 
Yalu, I felt t hat milit ary necessity in the conduct o.f t e 
war made necessary, .first, t he intensification of our ec 
omic blockade against China; second, the imposition of a 
naval blockade against t he China coast; third, removal~ 
restrictions on air reconnais s ance of China's coastal a as 
and of anchuria; fourth, removal of restrictions on the 
forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logisticail 
support to contribute t[o their effective operations against 
the Chinese mainland. Applause~ 
• • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • • • 
In war th ere is no substitute for victory. There 
some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. 
They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history 
teaahes ,, with unmistakable emphasis, that appeasement but 
beets new and bloodier war. It points to no sin gle in-
stance where t his end has justified that means, where 
appeasement has led to more tban a sham peace. Like blae -
mail, it lays t he basis for new and successively greater 
demands until, a s in blackmail, violence becomes the only 
other alternative. why, my soldiers asked of me, surrend r 
militar y ~dvanta ges to an enemy in the field? I could no 
answer. lApplause J 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
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